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INTRODUCTION

The purchase and sale of producing oil and gas properties is a significant
part of an oil and gas practice in Louisiana.1 The term “producing oil and
gas properties” encompasses not only the principal asset (the mineral lease)
but also the equipment and wells that have been drilled pursuant to the
mineral lease, as well as the panoply of agreements, licenses, permits, and
other contractual rights assembled by the selling party in connection with
the development and exploitation of the mineral lease. For a variety of
reasons, a party who owns producing mineral leases might elect to divest
itself of those interests.
The reasons leading a leasehold owner to a decision to divest might
range from a desire to be relieved of future liabilities, or at least to pass
along such obligations to another, to “quit” the business, or to commit
capital to other ventures or enterprises. Additionally, in the current
environment of depressed prices for oil and gas, many exploration and
production (“E&P”) companies operating under a commercial line of
credit are facing the certainty of a redetermination of their borrowing base

1. Having practiced oil and gas law since the Spring of 1974, this Author
has been involved in innumerable transactions of the type discussed here,
involving the purchase and sale of producing properties in several states, totaling
per transaction purchase prices ranging from smaller amounts to many millions
of dollars. The total of all such transactions would be in the billions of dollars in
the aggregate.
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by their lender.2 In turn, this fact makes prudent an examination of
properties, which are not deemed to be “core,” to reduce secured debt by
selling such properties and paying down debt. Regardless of the reason for
divesting itself of the interest, producing oil and gas properties will still
have significant value, especially to those who are able to put them to a
more profitable use.
Although a major oil and gas—or even a large independent—company
might deem a producing property to no longer be profitable according to
its own internal financial yield or performance requirements, a smaller
independent company can often find significant value in the same suite of
assets. The smaller company may believe that it can operate the field more
efficiently or economically by lowering the per-barrel “lifting costs,”3 or
other expenses of operation, at least in comparison to the seller. This
marginal cost reduction is sometimes called “working the margins.”
Typically, the sale—and concomitant purchase—of producing oil and
gas properties entails several distinct phases: the announcement by the
seller of an intent to divest and consequential solicitation of potential
bidders; the preliminary evaluation of the assets being offered for sale; the
arrangement of preliminary terms, perhaps to be embodied in a “letter of
intent”; the negotiation and execution of a formal purchase and sale
agreement; the performance of “due diligence” on the part of the
purchaser; the closing of the transaction; and post-closing adjustments.
These necessary actions do not happen overnight, and each phase comes
with its own legal complications.
Several excellent papers have been delivered at the Louisiana Institute
on Mineral Law on this general topic, as well as on distinct aspects of the
transaction.4 At the Institute on Oil and Gas Law, which The Institute for
2. “The borrowing base for O&G loans is the estimated value of O&G that
can be produced from the mineral rights. It is determined by analyzing prior
production reports and independent engineering valuations.” OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION LENDING 17, 56
(2014), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type
/comptrollers-handbook/pub-ch-a-og.pdf. It is a “collateral base agreed to by the
borrower and lender that is used to limit the amount of funds the lender advances
the borrower. Id. The borrowing base specifies the maximum amount that can be
borrowed in terms of collateral type, eligibility, and advance rates.” Id. Typically,
but not universally, the amount of the loan would be based upon 80% of the value
of the borrower’s assets, supported by reserve reports, title opinions, etc. Id.
3. This term has reference to those costs incurred by the operator, and which
are “necessary to lift the oil from the ground.” Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp.,
604 P.2d 854, 857 n.8 (Okla. 1979).
4. See, e.g., Thomas G. Bateman, Jr., Representing Sellers and Buyers in the
Sale of Producing Properties: Fundamentals of the Acquisition Process, 34 ANN.
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Energy Law of The Center for American and International Law sponsors,
other fine journals have made other informative presentations.5 Recent
developments, principally the spate of sales necessitated by the volatile
price of oil and gas and the concomitant pressure on companies to reduce
debt, suggest that now might be an appropriate time to take a more
contemporary look at the issues that might arise in the Bayou State.
A sufficient presentation on this topic could be accomplished by
merely reviewing and discussing the various terms and provisions
commonly contained in the customary purchase and sale agreement
(“PSA”),6 without looking “under the hood.” An understanding of the
legal principles that embrace or support the salient clauses in the PSA,
however, is necessary to gain an insight into the import of those
provisions, as well as the legal requirements, if any, that are necessary in
respect of any particular contractual stipulation.
Fortunately, in many transactions, the “deal is closed” without the
need to give any significant consideration to these important matters. In
the unfortunate instance when the parties are not able to “close the deal,”
the occasion arises to resort to the law books to evaluate the respective
rights and obligations of the parties. A great deal can be said for knowing

INST. ON MIN. L. 163 (1987); Paul A. Strickland, Merchantable Title and the
Mineral Lease, 40 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 236 (1993); Robert L. Cabes, Rights
and Obligations of Third Parties in the Acquisition of Oil and Gas Properties, 40
ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 249 (1993); Don Sinex, Seller’s Duty to Disclose to Buyer,
47 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 197 (2000); Anthony C. Marino, Current Developments
in Producing Property Acquisitions: The Role of the Title Examiner in Acquisitions
& Frequently Encountered Lease Form Provisions, 59 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 25
(2012).
5. See, e.g., Harry C. Weeks, Advantageous Methods of Handling the
Purchase of Oil and Gas Properties, 3 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 387
(1952); Manro T. Oberwetter, The Sale and Purchasing of Producing Properties,
9 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 403 (1963); Jack E. Earnest, Sale and Purchase of
Oil and Gas Properties, 16 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 189 (1965); Phillip
R. Clark, Producing Property Acquisitions: Legal and Practical Considerations,
37 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 9-1 (1986); James L. Irish, Structuring
Acquisitions of Oil and Gas Properties: Significant Considerations in Deciding
Whether to Purchase a Company or to Purchase Its Assets, 40 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX’N 2-1 (1989); Richard C. Rice, Sales Agreements for the
Disposition of Oil and Gas Properties: A Seller’s Perspective, 46 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX’N 5 (1995); David Patton, Purchasing Onshore Oil and Gas Assets
(The Buyer’s Perspective), 59 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. 12 (2008).
6. In the jargon of the industry, and frequently herein, the purchase and sale
agreement is commonly called simply the “PSA.”
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the fundamental, relevant rules before the deal goes south in the Bayou
State.
This Article presents a broad overview of the most important rules and
legal issues surrounding the purchase and sale of producing properties in
Louisiana. Part I considers the fundamentals of the purchase and sale of
producing properties, including the nature of producing properties and the
factors that motivate a party to sell its producing mineral leases. As the
Article examines this topic in the Bayou State, attention is given to the
sources of laws. Part II examines pertinent provisions of the Louisiana
Mineral Code as they relate to the assignment of mineral leases. Part III
expands the examination of applicable law to include the relevant
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code, particularly the nominate contract
of sale. As the purchase and sale of producing oil and gas properties is to
be evidenced by a written agreement, Part IV takes up the contractual
provisions typically encountered in purchase and sale agreements. This
Part also explains in detail the steps taken in anticipation of a closing.
Finally, the Article considers the range of remedies available to the parties
in the regrettable circumstance that a transaction is not consummated as
contemplated by the PSA.
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE SALE OF PRODUCING OIL
AND GAS PROPERTIES
To understand the nuances of a PSA involving producing oil and gas
properties in Louisiana, one must first have a firm grasp on the legal
foundations underlying such agreements. This task is challenging, because
a complex network of statutes, regulations, and jurisprudential rules
govern mineral interests in the Bayou State. For this reason, this Part will
discuss the nature of producing oil and gas properties as well as the sale of
such properties in practice.
A. The Nature of Producing Oil and Gas Properties
Fundamentally, the sale of producing oil and gas properties is the sale
of immovable property,7 at least so far as the principal asset is concerned.
The principal asset is the mineral lease because without that vital
agreement, the right to be on the property of another—and to produce oil
and gas from that property—generally does not exist.8
7. “A mineral [lease] is an incorporeal immovable. It is alienable and
heritable.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:18 (2000); see also id. § 31:16.
8. Id. § 31:114 (“A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is granted
the right to explore for and produce minerals.”). But see id. § 31:21 (“A mineral
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Certainly other important rights and interests are involved and
necessarily transferred, and such rights and interests are not always subject
to the laws pertaining to the alienation of immovable property.9 As
important and as critical as such interests are for the prudent operation of the
producing field, however, they intrinsically follow or trail the disposition of
the principal asset—the mineral lease. Without the ownership of the mineral
lease, the ancillary rights or interests, standing alone, are relatively
inconsequential and certainly are not sufficient to confer upon the purchaser
the right to operate on the land and to produce hydrocarbons.10
B. Sales Involving Producing Oil and Gas Properties in Practice
The sale of producing oil and gas properties is essentially contractual:
most “deals” live or die with the PSA. The PSA is the “sophisticated”
contract, which undertakes to anticipate and cover all contingencies that
might potentially arise between the seller and the purchaser.
Both in practice and in law, there is rarely a need to “go to the law
books,” that is, to evaluate the reason why a particular action is done or
not done in a strict legal sense. Even so, having a basic understanding of
why “this works” or “that does not work” in the negotiation or execution
of a PSA or in its administration is still important.
With this observation, giving consideration to the fundamental
“ground rules” that might come into play in connection with the sale of
producing oil and gas properties is appropriate. The proper starting point
is the statutory or codal law of Louisiana.11
C. The “Hierarchy of Pertinent Law”12
Heaven forbid that a dispute should arise and that the transaction is
not perfectly consummated as contemplated by the PSA. The seller can
blame the purchaser, and certainly vice versa, but the dispute exists. In a
PSA, which is governed by Louisiana law, the “ground rules” are provided
servitude is the right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the purpose of
exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to possession and
ownership.”).
9. Examples of these “other important rights” would include servitude
agreements (sometimes called “rights-of-way”) and other contracts in support of
operations or production.
10. See supra note 8.
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2015) (“The sources of law are legislation and
custom.”).
12. Portions of this section constitute an adaptation of PATRICK S. OTTINGER,
LOUISIANA MINERAL LEASES — A TREATISE ch. 3, pt. I (forthcoming 2016).
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by applicable law. What are the “ground rules” to evaluate the position of
each party?
As in any dispute, an established “hierarchy of law” supplies the
principles to resolve the controversy, depending on its nature. Louisiana
Mineral Code article 2 provides the starting point for this hierarchy:
The provisions of this Code are supplementary to those of the
Louisiana Civil Code and are applicable specifically to the subject
matter of mineral law. In the event of conflict between the
provisions of this Code and those of the Civil Code or other laws
the provisions of this Code shall prevail. If this Code does not
expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation, the Civil
Code or other laws are applicable.13
As pertaining to mineral leases—and contracts to which they pertain—this
direction to turn to the Mineral Code, rather than to the “Civil Code or
other laws” in matters of mineral law, is concordant with Louisiana Civil
Code article 2672, which provides that a “mineral lease is governed by the
Mineral Code.”14
If the Mineral Code “does not expressly or impliedly provide for a
particular situation, the Civil Code or other laws are applicable.”15 In this
sense, other provisions in the Civil Code and the Revised Statutes are said
to be “suppletive” to the Mineral Code in that those sources will “fill in
the blanks” if the Mineral Code does not provide an answer or guidance
with regard to a particular issue under the mineral law of this state.16

13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2.
14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2672.
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2.
16. The distinction between an “imperative” law and a “suppletive” law has
been explained by the Louisiana Supreme Court as follows:
Statutory rules may be either imperative or suppletive. Rooted in public
policy considerations, an imperative rule is applied without regard to the
intention of the individuals concerned. A prohibitory law . . . is one that
is cast in the imperative form, but exhibits a negative, rather than
positive, command. . . . A suppletive rule, on the other hand, applies only
if those affected by it have not excluded its application. . . . Thus,
distinction between imperative and suppletive rules determines whether
private individuals can set aside rules established by the legislature and
regulate their legal relations by private agreement. If an agreement
contravenes an imperative rule, it is absolutely null; thus, it is not subject
to ratification and may be annulled in judicial proceedings instituted by
any interested party.
E. L. Burns Co. v. Cashio, 302 So. 2d 297, 300 (La. 1974) (footnotes omitted).
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A recognized hierarchy exists for the resolution of an issue pertaining
to a controversy or dispute between a seller and purchaser of mineral
leases under a PSA: (1) the PSA itself, as the “law between the parties”;17
(2) the Louisiana Mineral Code, if the PSA does not address a particular
“subject matter of mineral law”;18 (3) the Civil Code, the Revised Statutes,
or “other [applicable] laws,” if the Louisiana Mineral Code “does not
expressly or impliedly provide for a particular situation”;19 (4) if neither
the purchase and sale agreement nor legislation address a particular subject
or issue, resort may be had to custom and usages of the industry;20 and (5)
if neither the PSA nor legislation nor custom “provide for a particular
situation,” reference may be had to equitable considerations.21
D. Influence of Decisions of Other States22
Because of the nature of the oil and gas industry, and in recognition of
the fact that certain issues, practices, and agreements are common in many
oil and gas producing states, the courts of Louisiana have occasionally
taken cognizance of the published decisions of other states where a
particular issue has not previously been considered by a court in Louisiana.
This is particularly true with respect to the alienation of a mineral lease, in
contrast to the mineral servitude or mineral royalty, because of the
functional similarity of the Louisiana mineral lease to the lease contract in
other states. More importantly, although the mineral lease is also
contractually based, the other types of mineral rights are essentially
codally based.23

17. “Contracts have the effect of law for the parties.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983.
18. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:2.
19. Id.
20. “Custom results from practice repeated for a long time and generally
accepted as having acquired the force of law. Custom may not abrogate
legislation.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3; see also id. art. 2054. This last cited article
“applies in circumstances where the contract is not ambiguous or doubtful, but
simply fails to address a particular question.” Ellwood Oil Co. v. Anderson, 655
So. 2d 694, 697 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
21. “When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from legislation
or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably,
resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 4.
22. Portions of this Section are an adaptation of Patrick S. Ottinger, From the
Courts to the Code: The Origin and Development of the Law of Louisiana on
Mineral Rights, 1 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 5 (2012).
23. The intrinsic attributes of a mineral servitude and a mineral royalty are
set forth in the Mineral Code with limited opportunity to alter those principles. In
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As the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated, “[a]lthough the decisions
of other jurisdictions are not controlling on the Courts of Louisiana, if they
determine an issue practically identical with the one under consideration,
they possess at least a persuasive effect and merit attention.”24 The most
prominent example of the influence of a foreign court on an important
issue under Louisiana mineral law is the recognition that the Louisiana law
pertaining to the doctrine of production in “paying quantities” finds its
genesis in a ruling of the Supreme Court of Texas.25 Indeed, as noted in
the official comment to Mineral Code article 124, Louisiana’s current law
on this subject is fashioned in large part on the pronouncements of the
Supreme Court of Texas in Clifton v. Koontz.26 Beyond that particular
concept, Louisiana courts have considered cases from other oil and gas
producing states in litigation over royalty payments based upon “market
value,”27 the treatment of “post-production costs,”28 and the interpretation
of the model form operating agreement.29
A number of cases involving the purchase and sale of producing oil
and gas properties have been decided under the laws of other states,
particularly if no Louisiana case has addressed the issue.30 It must be
understood, however, that a sales transaction governed by Louisiana law
would be controlled by the substantive provisions of the Civil Code
relative to sale, and would not be governed by principles of law of another
contrast, the mineral lease is a contract, and the principles of “freedom of
contract” apply with minimal limitations arising out of public policy.
24. C H F Fin. Co. v. Jochum, 127 So. 2d 534, 539 (La. 1961); see also
Michiels v. Succession of Gladden, 180 So. 862, 864 (La. Ct. App. 1938), aff’d,
183 So. 217 (1938).
25. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:124 cmt. (2000).
26. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959); see also Patrick S. Ottinger, Production in
“Paying Quantities”—A Fresh Look, 65 LA. L. REV. 635 (2005); Patrick S.
Ottinger, Production in “Paying Quantities”—A Fresh Look, 51 ANN. INST. ON
MIN. L. 24 (2004).
27. See, e.g., Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1337 (La.
1982) (“We note that the same or similar contract language has often been
interpreted by the courts of other jurisdictions . . . .”); Shell Oil Co. v. Williams,
Inc., 428 So. 2d 798, 801 (La. 1983) (“In our review of the jurisprudence of other
jurisdictions, we note that the Texas Supreme Court and the United States Court
of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, have addressed this issue.”).
28. Henry, 418 So. 2d at 1336 (citing, but not following, Texas Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968)).
29. See, e.g., Clovelly Oil Co. v. Midstates Petroleum Co., 112 So. 3d 187
(La. 2013). In the interest of full disclosure, your Author represented certain amici
curiae in this suit.
30. See infra Part III.C.3.
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state.31 Still, these other cases are helpful to the extent that they consider
and explain the meaning and purpose of certain clauses or provisions that
are customary to PSAs in common use in this sector of the oil and gas
industry.
II. PROVISIONS OF THE LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE PERTINENT TO THE
SALE AND ASSIGNMENT OF MINERAL LEASES
When the intent of the parties to a PSA of producing properties is not
to the contrary, considering some important provisions of the Louisiana
Mineral Code that are pertinent to the purchase and sale of mineral leases
is essential. In fact, some of these provisions may not be altered by contract
because they are rules of public order.32 This Part will examine some
important Mineral Code rules as well as their relation to provisions in other
areas of Louisiana law.
A. The Alienability of a Mineral Lease33
A little over a century ago, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered—
and rejected—a contention that a contract for the exploration and
development of minerals34 was not assignable on the asserted theory that
such contract was “personal on the part of the obligor.”35 This suggestion
was based on the lessor’s contention that “the obligation ‘to drill with a
view to finding commercial substances’ is purely personal on the part of
the obligor.”36 The court did not consider this argument, determining that
the “contract does not purport to impose any such obligation on [the
obligor].”37 The lessor then urged that the contract was not assignable
because “no mention is made in it of assigns, or of the right to assign.”38
This argument—that contractual silence or omission resulted in a negation
of the right to assign—was summarily rejected by the Court:

31. See infra Part IV.J.3.
32. See infra Part II.B.
33. Portions of this section constitute an adaptation of OTTINGER, supra note 12.
34. At the time of this decision, the courts had not fully determined the
juridical or legal character of what is now recognized as a “mineral lease.” For the
history of the development of the mineral lease in Louisiana, see William M. Hall,
The Juridical Nature of the Mineral Lease, 11 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 106 (1964).
35. Anse La Butte (Le Danois) Oil & Mineral Co. v. Babb, 47 So. 754, 755
(La. 1908).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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But, manifestly, there was no need of any such mention, since a man
may assign whatever right not purely personal to himself he may be
the owner of. The rule is that all things of value, incorporeal as well
as corporeal, may be made the subject of sale.39
Thus, being a “thing of value,” or an item of commerce, a mineral lease is
freely assignable. Today, a series of articles in both the Louisiana Mineral
Code and the Louisiana Revised Civil Code establish this uncontroversial
proposition.40
B. Inapplicability of the Remedy of Lesion Beyond Moiety41
A necessary corollary of the fact that a mineral lease is a “real right”42
and an “incorporeal immovable”43 is that all laws pertinent to immovable
property with certain limited exceptions apply to a mineral lease.44
One law applicable to the sale of immovable property in general, but
which does not apply to the sale or assignment of a mineral lease, is the
vendor’s remedy of lesion beyond moiety.45 Lesion beyond moiety
involves a seller’s rescission of a sale of a corporeal immovable “when the
price is less than one half of the fair market value of the immovable.”46
Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 states that a “sale of a mineral [lease]
is not subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety.”47 The reason for this
rule is that, by their very nature, the valuation and the existence of minerals
is highly speculative.48
39. Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 2448 (1870)).
40. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:18, :127 (2000); LA. CIV. CODE arts.
454, 470, 1984, 2448 (2015).
41. Portions of this section constitute an adaptation of OTTINGER, supra note
12, ch. 2, pt. I.
42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16.
43. Id. § 31:18.
44. “Mineral rights, including mineral leases, are classified under the Mineral
Code as incorporeal immovables and are subject to the Civil Code articles
respecting immovable property.” Guy Scroggins, Inc. v. Emerald Exploration,
401 So. 2d 680, 684 (La. Ct. App. 1981). In the interest of full disclosure, your
Author represented the defendant in this suit.
45. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:17.
46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589 (2015).
47. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:17.
48. See McCoy v. Ark. Natural Gas Co., 165 So. 632, 633 (La. 1936) (“A
review of the cases on that subject-matter shows that damages were not allowed
because of the uncertain and speculative nature of the loss complained of. One of
the reasons which we assigned in this case when it was previously before us for
sustaining the exceptions of no cause and no right of action was that ‘the loss
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Although lesion does not apply to the “sale of a mineral [lease],”49 one
should note that this article is probably not needed because “[l]esion can be
claimed only by the seller and only in sales of corporeal immovables.”50
C. Other Consequences Arising Out of the Assignment of the Mineral
Lease
Each of the articles that follow article 127 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code address distinct consequences arising out of an assignment or
sublease of a mineral lease, and they do not differentiate themselves in
reference to one type of transfer from the other.51 These consequences
pertain principally to the assignment, not the PSA.52 Although important,
these are beyond the scope of this Article. The reader may, however, refer
to another Article by this Author for greater edification of these matters.53
III. PROVISIONS OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE PERTINENT TO THE SALE
AND ASSIGNMENT OF MINERAL LEASES
Because the sale of producing properties will invoke the law of the
Bayou State, it is instructive to examine the various types of agreements that
might be involved in this transaction. An array of agreements might be
entered into by the parties in anticipation of a purchase and sale of producing
properties. Fundamentally, the Louisiana Civil Code recognizes types of
agreements that are preparatory to the sale, as well as agreements of sale. A
sale is a “nominate contract,” which is defined in Louisiana Civil Code
article 1914 as being “those [contracts] given a special designation such as
sale, lease, loan, or insurance.”54 That same codal authority informs that
other agreements associated with the sale may be classified as “innominate,”
as they “are those [contracts] with no special designation.”55

complained of was, manifestly, more a matter of uncertainty and speculation than
of fact or estimate.’”).
49. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:17.
50. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589.
51. Each article treats of both assignments and subleases, referencing both an
assignor and an assignee, and a sublessor and a sublessee, thus indicating that the
subject matter of each article pertains to both types of conveyance.
52. As will be seen, the PSA is a contract to sell, not the sale itself.
53. Patrick S. Ottinger, What’s in a Name? Assignments and Subleases of
Mineral Leases Under Louisiana Law, 58 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 283 (2011).
54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1914.
55. Id.
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A. Applicability of the Law of Sales
At its core, the sale of producing oil and gas properties is the sale of
immovable property. Although the principal asset involved in a transaction
embodied in a PSA pertaining to producing oil and gas properties is
subject to the law of lease, the alienation of that asset is indisputably
addressed in the context of the law of sale. “Sale is a contract whereby a
person transfers ownership of a thing to another for a price in money.”56
Indeed, in the vernacular, the sale of producing oil and gas properties is
the sale of “real estate,” such that case law dealing with the purchase and
sale of land—or even of a residence or commercial building—is pertinent.
Therefore, cases involving sale agreements of land can provide guidance
on related issues.
The terms of the PSA, however, may subject it to some other area of
Louisiana law. For example, if an overriding royalty interest or some other
form of control is reserved, the transaction is, in legal contemplation, a
sublease, not a sale.57 A sublease is essentially a “lease of a lease,” with
the result that the law of lease would be the controlling regime. The
Supreme Court has stated that a “sublessor . . . assumes all rights, interest,
obligations, penalties, etc., enjoyed by and granted to the original lessor.”58
B. Agreements Preparatory to the Sale
Some agreements may be made in preparation of a sales contract. The
Louisiana Civil Code recognizes three particular types of such agreements:
an option, a contract to sell, and a right of first refusal. Although each type
of agreement preparatory to sale is subject to distinct rules, which are
detailed below, it is important to note some common governing principles
that apply to all of these agreements.
Some common governing principles of agreements preparatory to sale
are especially important for the present discussion. For one, all nominate
agreements preparatory to sale involving immovables have limited
effectiveness against third persons: “An option, right of first refusal, or
contract to sell that involves immovable property is effective against third
persons only from the time the instrument that contains it is filed for registry
in the parish where the immovable is located.”59 Secondly, the option and
right of first refusal are subject to additional limitations regarding
56. Id. art. 2439.
57. See Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 116 So. 379, 380 (La. 1928); Berman v. Brown,
70 So. 2d 433, 445–46 (La. 1953).
58. Wier v. Grubb, 82 So. 2d 1, 7 (La. 1955).
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2429.
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permissible terms and divisibility. As for permissible terms, “[a]n option
or a right of first refusal that concerns an immovable thing may not be
granted for a term longer than ten years.”60 As for divisibility, “[t]he right
to exercise an option and the right of first refusal are indivisible. When
either of such rights belongs to more than one person all of them must
exercise the right.”61 In addition to these general governing principles,
each of the nominate agreements preparatory to sale having particular
governing principles.
1. Option
An option to buy or sell is defined as “a contract whereby a party gives
to another the right to accept an offer to sell, or to buy, a thing within a
stipulated time.”62 The requirements of an option mirror the requirements of
the sale it contemplates, including specification of the thing, specification of
the price, and meeting relevant form requirements.63 As the Louisiana Civil
Code makes clear, “[t]he acceptance or rejection of an offer contained in an
option is effective when received by the grantor.”64 Although “[r]ejection
of the offer contained in an option terminates the option,” an acceptance
binds the parties to a contract to sell.65 In addition, an acceptance brings
about certain warranties of the assignor by operation of law: “The assignor
of an option to buy a thing warrants the existence of that option, but does
not warrant that the person who granted it can be required to make a final
sale.”66
Although the requirement of a further act following acceptance of the
option seems indispensable for immovables, it would also appear to make
perfect sense for the transfer of certain movables, such as a drilling rig or
shares of stock. At any rate, this rule is not mandatory, and the parties are
always at liberty to provide otherwise in their agreement.67 It is not typical
to encounter an option to sell producing oil and gas properties, principally
for the reason that the risk of fluctuation of value would be on the optionor60. Id. art. 2628 (“Nevertheless, if the option or right of first refusal is granted
in connection with a contract that gives rise to obligations of continuous or
periodic performance, an option or a right of first refusal may be granted for as
long a period as required for the performance of those obligations.”).
61. Id. art. 2630.
62. Id. art. 2620.
63. Id.
64. Id. art. 2621.
65. Id. A counteroffer does not terminate the option. Id.
66. Id. art. 2622 (“If, upon exercise of the option, the person who granted it
fails to make a final sale, the assignee has against the assignor the same rights as
a buyer without warranty has against the seller.”).
67. See id. arts. 7, 1983.
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seller, not on the optionee-purchaser who enjoys the ability to enforce a
sale by exercising the option or simply walk away with impunity.68
2. Contract to Sell
The contract to sell is defined as “[a]n agreement whereby one party
promises to sell and the other promises to buy a thing at a later time, or upon
the happening of a condition, or upon performance of some obligation by
either party.”69 Thus, such a contract does not immediately transfer
ownership of the thing. The contract does, however, “give[] either party the
right to demand specific performance.”70 Like the option, a contract to sell
“must set forth the thing and the price, and meet the formal requirements
of the sale it contemplates.”71
3. Right of First Refusal
The “right of first refusal” is an arrangement that is both common and
important to the parties. The exercise of a right of first refusal would result
in the subtraction of an asset from the transaction and a concomitant
reduction in the purchase price. By the same token, if the holder of a
preferential right of purchase is not properly and timely notified, its rights
are not diminished and litigation could ensue after the closing of the
transaction. These issues, and others, are an important component of both
due diligence and closing the transaction.
a. General
The “right of first refusal,” pacte de préférence, is a unilateral juridical
act whereby “[a] party . . . agree[s] that he will not sell a certain thing
without first offering it to a certain person,” which “may be enforced by
specific performance.”72 As the Louisiana Civil Code makes clear, “[t]he
grantor of a right of first refusal may not sell to another person unless he
has offered to sell the thing to the holder of the right on the same terms, or
on those specified when the right was granted if the parties have so
agreed.”73 Thus, the grantor of a right of first refusal (unlike the grantor of
68. Of course, the doctrine of “freedom of contact” would permit contracting
parties to construct an opportunity for the optionor to terminate, or even foreclose
the optionee’s exercise of, the option if values of product reach a certain level.
69. Id. art. 2623.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. art. 2625.
73. Id. art. 2626.
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an option) is only conditionally bound to enter into a contract of sale if and
when that person is contemplating selling to another.
The right of first refusal is subject to default (suppletive) temporal
limitations based on the nature of the object of the right: “Unless otherwise
agreed, an offer to sell the thing to the holder of a right of first refusal must
be accepted within ten days from the time it is received if the thing is
movable, and within thirty days from that time if the thing is immovable.”74
If the grantor fails to conclude a sale or contract to sell with a third person
within six months of the grantee being able to exercise its right of first
refusal, however, that right will subsist even if the grantee failed to exercise
it.75
b. “Pref Rights” in the Industry
Finding that the properties are subject to a “preferential right to
purchase”—often called a “pref right” in the jargon of the industry—is not
uncommon.76 Indeed, the model form operating agreement, which is
prevalently used in Louisiana, contains a “preferential right to purchase”
provision, although parties are free to delete it.77
Case law in Louisiana enforces these types of arrangements, and it is
an ordinary and necessary part of due diligence to, first, identify these
rights, and then to seek to secure a waiver or lapse of time without exercise
of a “pref right.” Case law in Texas explains the “pref right,” as follows:
A preferential right, also known as a right of first refusal or
preemptive right, is a right granted to a party giving him or her the
first opportunity to purchase property if the owner decides to sell
it. A preferential right has been described as a dormant option.
Once the property owner conveys the terms of the offer to the
74. Id. art. 2627.
75. Id.
76. See Robert J. Sergesketter, Preferential Rights to Purchase: The Basics,
and the Most Interesting Pref. Rights Case You’ve Never Heard About, HOUS. L.
REV.: OFF THE RECORD, Spring 2015, at 43, 46 (“First, let us get some
nomenclature out of the way. Preferential Rights to Purchase often are referred to
as Rights of First Refusal, or ‘RoFRs.’ They also are referred to as Preferential
Purchase Rights (the naming convention primarily used in this Article),
Preferential Rights, Pref. Rights, Preemptive Rights, and Contingent Rights.”).
77. A widely used form of operating agreement (in the Bayou State and
elsewhere), is the AAPL Form 610—the Model Form Operating Agreement
published by the American Association of Professional Landmen (AAPL). First
introduced in 1956 at its Annual Meeting in Denver, Colorado, revised forms were
issued by the AAPL in 1977, 1982 and 1989.
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rightholder, the rightholder then has the power to accept or reject
the offer. Thus, when the property owner gives notice of his intent
to sell, the preferential right matures or “ripens” into an
enforceable option.78
The offer to purchase must strictly abide by the requirements of the
agreement. For example, a violation of a right of first refusal (“ROFR”)
contained in an operating agreement was found in Fordoche, Inc. v.
Texaco, Inc.79 In that case, the ROFR clause of the Joint Operating
Agreement (“JOA”) provided as follows:
Before the sale to a third party by any Operating Party of its
interest, in whole or in part, in the properties affected by this
agreement, the other Operating Parties shall be given the refusal
thereof at the best price offered in good faith by a third party, and
such other Operating Parties shall have the preferred right to
purchase at the price stated, which right shall be exercised within
thirty (30) days after receipt of written notice of the offer made by
a third party . . . .80
The court noted that “[i]t is self-evident that the 1962 [JOA] extends
appellants’ ROFR to TEPI’s entire working interest in its mineral leases
subject to that JOA. The text of that agreement provides, ‘before the sale
to a third party . . . of its interest . . . in the properties affected by this
agreement.’”81 The court held that “TEPI violated the August 29, 1962
JOA by failing to offer the entirety of its interest in the property affected
by the JOA to the Fordoche group, yet thereafter selling the entirety to a
third-party buyer, EnerVest.”82
Unique and difficult issues arise in a “package sale” involving
multiple fields where the ROFR burdens less than all of the properties
proposed to be sold by the seller. The necessity arises to allocate values
among the properties, so that any exercise of a “pref right” can be
effectuated on an equitable basis. The courts in Texas do not require a
holder of a preferential right to also acquire other assets in the “package,”

78. FWT, Inc. v. Haskin Wallace Mason Prop. Mgmt., L.L.P., 301 S.W.3d
787, 793 (Tex. App. 2009) (citations omitted).
79. 463 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2006).
80. Id. at 393.
81. Id. (emphasis in original).
82. Id.
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which were not subject to the “pref right” but were offered with the assets
burdened by the right.83
Additionally, issues may be presented if, rather than selling the
affected assets, a party divests the property by involuntary sales,84 by
donations, or by entering into a transfer of the stock of the record title
owner. This important component of a PSA has been the subject of
commentary85 as well as litigation in the Bayou State.
In Fina Oil and Chemical Co. v. Amoco Production Co.,86 Fina, the
non-operator, and Amoco, the operator, owned certain mineral leases in
equal indivision.87 The leases were subject to a joint operating agreement,
which contained a “preferential right to purchase” provision.88 In connection
with a corporate reorganization, Amoco transferred the entirety of its
interest to a subsidiary corporation, MW Petroleum Corporation (“MW”).89
Thereafter, Amoco sold all of the corporate stock in MW to Apache
Corporation.90
83. Navasota Res., L.P. v. First Source Tex., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 526, 534–35
(Tex. App. 2008).
84. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a right of first refusal applied
to a judicial sale. Price v. Town of Ruston, 132 So. 653, 656 (La. 1931).
85. See, e.g., Harry M. Reasoner, Preferential Purchase Rights in Oil and
Gas Instruments, 46 TEX. L. REV. 57 (1967); Harlan Abright, Preferential Right
Provisions and Their Applicability to Oil and Gas Instruments, 32 SW. L.J. 803
(1978); Jeffrey J. Scott, Restrictions on Alienation Applied to Oil and Gas
Transactions, 31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1 (1985); John English, Dealing
with Third Parties, 43 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 169 (1996); Terry I. Cross, The Ties
that Bind: Preemptive Rights and Restraints on Alienation that Commonly Burden
Oil and Gas Properties, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 93 (1999); Aimee L. Williams,
Restrictions on Assignment – Consent to Assign, Preferential Right to Purchase and
Maintenance of Uniform Interest Provisions, 49 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 224 (2002);
John R. Cooney, Recent Developments Concerning Joint Operating Agreements—
Preferential Rights and Exculpatory Clauses, 55 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. 11-1
(2004); Gerald F. Slattery, Jr., Understanding Area of Mutual Interest, Preferential
Rights and Maintenance of Uniform Interest Provisions in Joint Operating
Agreements, 56 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 323 (2009); Fred R. Pletcher & Anthony A.
Zoobkoff, ROFR Madness! Rights of First Refusal in Mining and Oil & Gas
Transactions, 56 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 4-1 (2010); Robert K. Wise et al.,
First-Refusal Rights Under Texas Law, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 433 (2010); Rick
Strange & Thomas Fahring, Rights of First Refusal and Package Oil and Gas
Transactions, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 29 (2011); Sergesketter, supra note 76.
86. 673 So. 2d 668 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
87. Id. at 670.
88. Id. at 671.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 672.
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Neither the transfer of the leasehold interest by Amoco to MW nor the
sale of the corporate stock in MW by Amoco to Apache were offered to
Fina in accordance with the “preferential right to purchase” provision
contained in the joint operating agreement.91 The provision explicitly did
not apply to transfers by a corporate party in connection with a merger,
consolidation, or reorganization to a parent, subsidiary, or affiliated
company.92
Fina filed suit, claiming that the transfer of the leasehold interest by
Amoco to MW triggered the preferential rights option contained in the
operating agreement.93 Fina admitted that “the sale of some or all of the
corporate stock of Amoco, while Amoco owned the lease interests, would
not have triggered the preferential rights and operator selection clauses.”94
According to the court, the “question then becomes why should the sale of
MW stock, while MW held the lease interests, engender a different
result?”95
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, agreeing that no
genuine issues of material fact remained.96 As stated by the court, the “issue
was whether, as a matter of law, the sale of stock of MW, the holder of the
lease interests, triggered the preferential rights operator selection clauses.”97
The court held as follows:
The transfer of the lease interests to MW was admittedly a valid
transfer. The sale of MW stock was not a sale or transfer of the
lease interests. MW still holds the lease interests. Thus, no transfer
of the lease interests occurred. Without a transfer of the lease
interests, the provisions of the various JOAs are not triggered.
How or whether MW can validly transfer the lease interests under
the JOAs is not the question before this court.98
A creative attempt to circumvent the right of first refusal by characterizing
a proposed transaction as a merger, rather than a sale, was unsuccessful in
one case not involving oil and gas properties.99 In McCarthy v. Osborn, the
plaintiff owned corporate stock subject to a restriction on transfer, requiring

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. 670.
Id.
Id. at 676.
McCarthy v. Osborn, 65 So. 2d 776 (La. 1953).
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that the shares “offered for sale” first be offered to the shareholders.100 As
the court noted:
According to the petition, the stockholders and the Board of
Directors first attempted to sell the stock and assets of the Osborn
Life Insurance Company. They abandoned their intention to sell
when the plaintiff opposed it and offered to purchase the stock of
the corporation which she had a perfect right to do under the
provisions of the charter and stock certificates heretofore set out.
The allegations of the petition are to the effect that the so-called
merger is nothing more than a sale. In other words, a sale
disguised as a merger to eliminate the plaintiff's rights.101
The trial court sustained an objection of no cause of action,102 but the
Supreme Court reversed, holding, as follows:
We have carefully examined the petition and have arrived at the
conclusion that the facts alleged are sufficient to show that by the
manipulation of the Board of Directors and stockholders that the
plaintiff was defrauded of her rights and prevented from having a
proprietary interest in the so-called merged or new corporation.103
An attempt to circumvent the right of first refusal by characterizing a
transfer as a dation en paiement, rather than a sale, was disallowed in
another case104 in which the court explained its disallowance of the
scheme:
Because the dation en paiement transfers ownership and has the
same effect as an ordinary sale, drawing a meaningless distinction
between a sale and a dation en paiement in the context of this
contract would allow the Optimist Club to circumvent its
obligation simply on the basis of semantics. The object of the
February 20, 1974 contract was to give Mr. Gorum the right of
first refusal to the property in the event the Optimist Club decided
to divest itself of ownership. We find that an interpretation that
allows the Optimist Club to divest itself of ownership through a

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 777.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 778.
Gorum v. Optimist Club of Glenmora, 771 So. 2d 690 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
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dation en paiement without providing Mr. Gorum with a right of
first refusal results in an absurd and unintended consequence.105
Although the “pref right” provision in many operating agreements
requires that the right holder be provided “full information concerning the
proposed sale,” the courts tend to require “reasonable” information sufficient
to provide “information considered material to the right holders’ ability to
exercise the preferential right on the same terms and conditions as the bona
fide purchaser.”106
A holder of a “pref right” who is not notified does not thereby lose its
rights.107 Rather, the purchaser of an asset burdened by a preferential right
to purchase acquires the asset subject to the holder’s rights.108 Notice must
be given to the right holder, who has a reasonable time to elect or decline
to purchase the interest.109
C. Other Associated Agreements
It is customary to enter other types of arrangements in anticipation of the
sale of the producing oil and gas assets. These agreements are innominate
contracts that are intended to facilitate the transaction contemplated by the
PSA.
1. Confidentiality Agreements
Parties often enter into a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement
to protect certain non-public information from disclosure in the event the
transaction does not close. Typically, this form of agreement is the first to
be executed in anticipation of the ultimate execution of a PSA.
An agreement of this type would obligate the purchaser to strictly
maintain the confidentiality of, and agree to not disclose, the seller’s
information of a private, sensitive nature, such as financial information,
reserve reports, and other information that is not generally available to the
public. A confidentiality agreement facilitates the conduct of due diligence
by the purchaser and thus balances the legitimate interests of both the
seller and the purchaser. The agreement is typically unilateral, obligating

105. Id. at 695.
106. See, e.g., Fasken Land & Minerals, Ltd. v. Occidental Permian Ltd., 225
S.W.3d 577, 590 (Tex. App. 2005).
107. See McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159, 174 (Tex. App. 2004).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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the purchaser to keep confidential information obtained in a review of
seller’s records.
Generally, the scope of the seller’s information sought to be kept
confidential is all information of the seller, particularly analyses, reports,
studies, etc. By the same token, common exclusions from the scope of
confidentiality include information that is: (a) not disclosed in writing or
reduced to writing and so marked with an appropriate confidentiality
legend within 30 days of disclosure; (b) already in the purchaser’s
possession at the time of the disclosure; (c) part of the public domain—or
later becomes part of the public domain—through no fault of the
purchaser; (d) received from a third party having no obligations of
confidentiality to the seller; (e) independently developed by the purchaser
without using the confidential information; or (f) required by law or
regulation to be disclosed.
Additionally, the purchaser may still provide information that is
subject to confidentiality and non-disclosure to its counsel, accountants,
or bankers, but strictly for purposes of the transaction being considered.
The careful seller might seek to impose a “need to know” limitation on
those to whom the data may be permissibly shared.
Once the sale is consummated, and the seller has received the
consideration for the conveyed assets, the seller is generally no longer
concerned with the manner in which the purchaser will utilize this
information, unless its scope also encompasses assets retained, but not
sold, by the seller. If the transaction is not consummated, the agreement
will typically require the purchaser to return all information or destroy it
and certify to the seller that it has been destroyed.
Closely associated with the contractual arrangement that requires
confidentiality of certain information is a question of whether certain data
would constitute a “trade secret” to be regulated under the Louisiana
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.110
2. Term Sheets
A “term sheet” is less an agreement or a contract than a roadmap to a
more formal agreement. Particularly in a larger, sophisticated transaction,
parties deem it appropriate to make sure that, at the nascent stage of
discussions and negotiations, both parties are “on the same page” and
“heading in the same direction.” Thus, a “term sheet” is often prepared to
110. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1431 to :1439 (2003 & Supp. 2016); see also
John Anthony Chavez, More Priceless than Gold: Trade Secrets in the Oil and
Gas Industry, 46 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 1 (1999).
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set forth the salient or material features of the anticipated transaction,
including terms, conditions and considerations, sometimes merely in the
form of “bullet points.” The execution of a “term sheet” serves as a guide
to the lawyer preparing a draft of a “letter of intent,” or PSA.
3. Letters of Intent
Once parties reach a preliminary understanding pertinent to the sale of
the properties, perhaps—but not necessarily—reduced to a “term sheet,”
entering into a Letter of Intent (“LOI”) is common.111 Generally, this is a
basic document that sets forth in greater detail the salient features of the
transaction and is intended to constitute a framework to lead the parties to
the confection of a more formal agreement. If the parties intend for the
LOI to merely be a more formalized document than the “term sheet” and
do not wish to be bound until a more formalized document is signed, that
intent should be made expressly.112
Indeed, Louisiana Civil Code article 1947 instructs that, “[w]hen, in
the absence of a legal requirement, the parties have contemplated a certain
form, it is presumed that they do not intend to be bound until the contract
is executed in that form.”113 For example, parties were not bound to a LOI
that stated, “[o]bviously, neither of us will be bound until a contract is
executed by both parties.”114
Nevertheless, depending on the language utilized, the court might find
a sufficient “meeting of the minds” to enforce such an agreement,
notwithstanding that the parties had called it “preliminary.” For example, in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Martin Exploration Co.,115 the Louisiana Supreme
Court noted that the use of the word preliminary “does not preclude the
agreement from being final until later agreements are reached or from being
the only agreement in the event that no other agreements are confected.”116
111. This type of agreement is sometimes called a “memorandum of
understanding,” or “MOU.”
112. Breaux Bros. Constr. Co. v. Associated Contractors, 77 So. 2d 17, 20 (La.
1954) (“It is elementary in our law, that where the negotiations contemplate and
provide that there shall be a contract in writing, neither party is bound until the
writing is perfected and signed.” (citing Fredericks v. Fasnacht, 30 La. Ann. 117
(1878) (emphasis in original))).
113. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1947 (2015).
114. Spillway Invs., L.L.C. v. Pilot Travel Ctrs. LLC, No. Civ.A.04-2451,
2005 WL 517498, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 22, 2005).
115. 447 So. 2d 469 (La. 1984). In the interest of full disclosure, the Author of
this Article represented a defendant in this suit.
116. Id. at 472.
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Further, the court found that the reference to a document “finalizing the
points listed above” did not evince an intent to be bound only upon the
execution of a later instrument.117 Nor did an allusion to future
“negotiations” render the “preliminary” agreement non-binding.118 To the
contrary, the Supreme Court held that the document was binding, as that
interpretation most accurately reflected the intentions of the parties.119
In Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, a case involving the anticipated
purchase and sale of producing properties,120 Chesapeake entered into an
agreement with Peak to acquire “deep rights” in the Haynesville Shale for
“the hefty sum of $15,000 per acre.”121 The parties entered an agreement in
July 2008, entitled “Offer to Purchase.”122 The court recounted how the
controversy arose: “When the price of natural gas plummeted several
months later, Chesapeake refused to honor its commitment.”123 Peak filed
suit to enforce the agreement.124
Chesapeake made two main arguments. First, “Chesapeake insisted
the July Agreement was simply an agreement to negotiate, or LOI, and not
binding. It claimed the agreement did not meet the requirements of the
Texas statute of frauds and was too indefinite to be enforced.”125 The court
rejected this defense, finding that “the property description contained in
the July Agreement achieves the same degree of ‘reasonable certainty’
found in other ‘recital of ownership’ cases,” such that the court could
“conclude that the Agreement contains an adequate nucleus of description
under the statute of frauds.”126
Another argument by Chesapeake was “that the July Agreement is too
indefinite to be enforced. Specifically, [Chesapeake] claim[ed] that the
parties did not intend to bind themselves by signing the letter and that the
agreement lacked essential terms.”127 This defense also failed, with the
court finding that the “July Agreement was sufficiently definite to be

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2012)
(applying Texas law).
121. Id. at 314.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 315.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 319.
127. Id. at 320.
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enforced.”128 The court affirmed an award for the plaintiffs of nearly $20
million.129
An LOI might be hybrid in that, although the writing might not be
intended to be binding, some provisions within the LOI should be
expressly declared to be binding. Examples of these binding provisions in
an otherwise non-binding writing include provisions dealing with
confidentiality or non-disclosure, governing law, and the exclusivity of the
LOI. These important components of the parties’ understanding, even in
an otherwise non-binding LOI, are meaningless if not made binding and
enforceable.130 Thus, an LOI seems to be non-binding, and no party can
have any liability thereunder to the other party.
In one significant case,131 however, the parties signed letters of intent
and a confidentiality agreement in contemplation of a relationship to
construct a crude oil pipeline from Oklahoma to Texas.132 Despite the
numerous explicit statements negating the existence of any enforceable
relationship, the court deemed the parties’ written agreements to be
sufficiently ambiguous that a jury had to determine if the parties intended
to be bound.133 Finding, despite the rather express repudiation of such a
relationship, that a partnership had been formed, the jury awarded Energy
Partners damages in the amount of $319 million.134 Thus, the parties’
numerous, explicit disavowals were not sufficient to overcome the
subsequent conduct of the parties, particularly statements made to third
parties.135
4. Access or Boarding Agreements
Depending on the character of the properties involved, the purchaser
or its consultants may need to have access to properties of the seller to
inspect such properties in association with the conduct of due diligence.
Particularly in connection with marine operations, or other high-risk
structural environments, the seller will insist that the purchaser execute an
access or boarding agreement. This agreement will authorize, under
128. Id. at 322.
129. Id. at 314.
130. Self-evidently, parties who desire confidentiality intend that such nondisclosure covenants be binding and enforceable, even if the LOI is not intended
to manifest a binding agreement.
131. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., v. Enter. Prods. Partners, L.P., No. DC
1112667, 2014 WL 10120268, at *1 (Tex. Dist. July 29, 2014).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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conditions stipulated therein, the purchaser and its consultants to enter the
property and conduct inspection or investigatory activities.
Typically, the access will be limited to specified times with advance
notice and accompanied by the seller’s designated representatives. The
purchaser will typically not be allowed to conduct intrusive, invasive, or
destructive inspections that alter or damage the property being inspected.
The purchaser will also be obligated to release the seller from liability in
advance and to indemnify the seller from any liability caused or damages
incurred by the purchaser or its investigatory team.
5. Transition Agreements
Typically, three critical dates are involved in a transaction concerning
the purchase and sale of producing oil and gas properties. The first is the
date of execution of the PSA, principally relevant in that it commences
certain periods of time, such as the due diligence period and the title defect
date by which the purchaser must assert any title, environmental, or other
defects discovered by its due diligence. Usually, the failure on the part of
the purchaser to timely assert a title defect results in a waiver of that
deficiency in title to the asset.
The effective date of the transaction is the next significant date. The
effective date is often some date—typically, 7:00 A.M. on the first date of
a calendar month—which precedes the date of execution of the agreement.
The final date of note is the date of closing. Although stipulated in the
PSA, this date is often deferred to a later date if necessary to conclude due
diligence or to obtain necessary consents or waivers from third parties.
When the transaction is consummated at the closing date, the purchaser
rarely assumes the management and administration of the conveyed assets
immediately. Because of the complexities of the purchase and sale of
producing properties, parties might execute a “transition agreement,” which
envisions that, for some period of time after the closing date, the seller will
continue to operate the property until the purchaser is in a position to assume
those responsibilities of ownership. Generally, this agreement includes an
undertaking by the seller to continue to produce oil and gas, market the
production, to receive the proceeds, to pay severance taxes and royalties,
and to pay vendors for their services or equipment, all for the account of the
purchaser.
If the assets are complex and numerous, perhaps located in multiple
parishes or states, an agreement of this sort allows a seamless and uninterrupted
transition of ownership that permits the purchaser a period of time to
familiarize itself with the assets and to set up its records so that it might
assume administrative duties.
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From the viewpoint of the seller, the agreement allows it to maintain
the value of the assets, for the benefit of both parties, by avoiding any
mistakes or missteps because the seller will continue to operate in the same
manner as it has historically done. The purchaser benefits from a transition
agreement as it is afforded the time to add requisite systems, personnel, or
equipment to manage these new assets and also to obtain necessary
regulatory approvals or permits.
If the property being sold and acquired is subject to an existing
operating agreement with third parties—other than the seller and the
purchaser—it is necessary to review that agreement to ensure that no
violation arises by reason of the sale. As a consequence of the sale, the
seller no longer owns an interest in the Contract Area and is deemed to
forfeit the right to operate the properties for the joint account.136
Additionally, the COPAS attached to the JOA should be reviewed to
ensure that costs being charged in this interim arrangement are consistent
with the strictures of that agreement, including the competitiveness of rates
charged for services.137 If the seller has served as operator, it might have
master service agreements in place with a variety of contractors or service
providers. Some period of time is necessary to transition those agreements
to the new operator.
The transition from seller to the purchaser is facilitated by periodic
meetings between representatives of the parties to coordinate activities in
the interim period of time, until the purchaser is ready to fully assume
responsibility for operational activities of the assets that it acquires at the
closing. Typically, under the regime of the transition agreement, the seller
is required to conduct its activities in a good and workmanlike manner and
as a reasonably prudent operator. Because of the hazardous nature of oil
and gas activities, it should be clarified and affirmed that the seller’s
employees remain the employees of the seller and not of the purchaser for
any purpose. The purchaser customarily indemnifies the seller from
liability, except for the willful misconduct or gross negligence of the seller
136. A common provision in the model form operating agreement states that,
“[i]f Operator . . . no longer owns an interest hereunder in the Contract Area, . . .,
Operator shall be deemed to have resigned without any action by Non-Operators,
except the selection of a successor.” AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement,
Form 610 (1982).
137. COPAS is the acronym for the Council of Petroleum Accountants
Societies. Mack Energy Co. v. Expert Oil & Gas, LLC, 159 So. 3d 437, 439 (La.
2015). COPAS procedures are a form of accounting procedure, which is the
standard in the oil and gas industry. See generally J. David Heaney, The Joint
Operating Agreement, the AFE and COPAS: What They Fail to Provide, 29
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 772 (1983); John E. Jolly, The COPAS Accounting
Procedures Demystified, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 21-1 (1988).
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or its employees. The parties should confirm that the insurance maintained
by the parties covers the activities and interests of each party.
If, for any reason, the purchaser is unable to operate the property after
the closing, the parties might also enter into a contract operating agreement
pursuant to which the seller or some other entity will operate the property
for the account and benefit of the purchaser. The contract operator is
typically compensated on a per diem, weekly, or monthly basis for its
services.
D. Agreements of Sale
Although important, the PSA is not the document that announces to
the world the transfer of the mineral leases from the seller to the purchaser.
The PSA is not customarily recorded, and does not need to be. Rather, that
important document provides and anticipates that the parties will evidence
the consummation of the transaction by executing and recording an
assignment. Although immaterial to its import,138 the name of the recorded
document might be “Conveyance, Assignment and Bill of Sale” or simply
“Assignment.”
This recorded document often makes reference to the PSA and
sometimes restates certain provisions that the parties deem the most
significant. Generally, these incorporated clauses pertain to allocation or
assumption of responsibility, agreements as to indemnity, and other
provisions. Although the indemnity obligation is valid between the parties,
regardless of whether the obligation is reflected of record, the beneficiary
of the indemnity often finds a sense of comfort in providing notice to third
persons of this particular arrangement.
The Assignment, being the “contract of sale,” is regulated by a series
of Louisiana Civil Code provisions. For one, the Assignment must contain
the essential elements of a sale: the thing, the price, and the consent of the
parties with respect to the thing and the price.139 The “thing” is the mineral
lease(s) that is contemplated by the PSA, as well as all other “things” being
sold, such as contracts, wells, equipment, records, etc. The “price” is the
purchase price specified in the PSA, which might be revised or adjusted in
accordance with its terms and provisions. Finally, the “consent” is self-

138. See Howard Trucking Co. v. Stassi, 474 So. 2d 955, 960 (La. Ct. App. 1985)
(“It is well-established that we are not bound by the label placed on a written
agreement or the subjective intent of the contracting parties, but must look to the
substance of the transaction in determining rights and obligations.”), aff’d, 485 So. 2d
915 (La. 1986).
139. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2439 (2015).
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evidently manifested by the execution of both the PSA, and the resulting
Assignment.
Secondly, the Assignment must be in proper form. Because the object
of the sale is immovable property, the Assignment “must be made by
authentic act or by act under private signature, except as provided in
Article 1839.”140 The “sale” is obviously embodied in a written agreement
executed by the seller (the “assignor”) and the purchaser (the “assignee”)
and is virtually never executed by way of an authentic act unless in the
extremely rare case the parties employ a credit sale.141 Notably, article 2440
makes an exception to the writing requirement “as provided in Article
1839.”142 That cited article provides, in relevant part, that a “transfer of
immovable property” may be made orally and “is valid between the parties,”
provided that “the property has been actually delivered and the transferor
recognizes the transfer when interrogated on oath.”143
Thirdly, the Assignment transfers ownership “between the parties as
soon as there is agreement on the thing and the price is fixed, even though
the thing sold is not yet delivered nor the price paid.”144 Although a literal
reading of this provision suggests that the PSA itself constitutes a vehicle
by which ownership is transferred between the parties, one must recognize
that the PSA—even though it constitutes an “agreement on the thing,” and
“fixes the price”—contains numerous conditions and requirements that
clearly negate any notion that it is intended to be the “agreement of sale”
sufficient to transfer ownership.
Fourthly, the Assignment “includes all accessories intended for its use
in accordance with the law of property.”145 This provision is important to
the assignee, as it ensures that the assignee acquires those “accessories
intended for [the] use” of the mineral leases. Still, the exhibits attached to
the PSA and which are virtually always attached to the assignment
140. Id. art. 2440.
141. Although a credit sale need not be executed by way of an authentic act to
validly convey the assets, it would be necessary to utilize that form if the seller
(mortgagor) in a credit sale wishes to employ executory process to enforce the
reserved mortgage, and vendor’s privilege. See generally Patrick S. Ottinger,
Enforcement of Real Mortgages by Executory Process, 51 LA. L. REV. 87 (1990).
142. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2440.
143. Id. art. 1839; see also Harter v. Harter, 127 So. 3d 5, 12 (La. Ct. App.
2013) (upholding an oral transfer of a working interest based upon the
corporation’s internal records and the conduct of the parties, and noting that,
“since [defendant’s] actions evidence an actual delivery of the interests and he
subsequently recognized such delivery under oath, the requirements for a valid
oral transfer found in Article 1839 have been met”).
144. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2456.
145. Id. art. 2461.
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typically will comprehensively describe and identify the contracts, wells,
equipment, records, etc., that support and enhance the operation of the
mineral leases conveyed.
Finally, the Assignment must fix the price “in a sum either certain or
determinable through a method agreed by them” and contemplate that the
price, which may not be “out of all proportion with the value of the thing
sold,” will actually be paid.146 The quality or sufficiency of the price being
paid by the assignee for the mineral leases and other properties is rarely,
if ever, an issue. The purchase price is robustly negotiated, and it is subject
to adjustment depending on conditions specified in the PSA. Purely as a
matter of custom and practice, parties do not usually set forth in the
Assignment the precise amount paid by the purchaser for the assets.
Usually, it is merely stipulated that “$100 and OVC” or some similar,
nominal amount was paid to and received by the assignor.147 The failure
to state the precise amount of the purchase price actually paid is not
problematic, however, for “[a]n obligation may be valid even though its
cause is not expressed.”148 Further, “[w]hen the expression of a cause in a
contractual obligation is untrue, the obligation is still effective if a valid
cause can be shown.”149 Indeed, one Louisiana court has held that “parol
evidence is clearly admissible between the parties to show the real
consideration of any contract.”150 Regardless, the “sale of a mineral right
is not subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety.”151
IV. CUSTOMARY FEATURES OF A PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
There are two alternative approaches to the acquisition of producing
properties, perhaps with variations. Arguably the more prevalent approach
involves the negotiation and ultimate execution of a PSA, which by its
express terms allows the purchaser a period of time after such execution to
conduct due diligence. The transaction will then proceed to a closing, unless
due diligence reveals a sufficient monetary level of title or other defects that
might afford the purchaser the option to “walk away” and to not close on
the acquisition.
Another approach is to “sign and close,” meaning that the PSA affords
no post-execution period of time within which to conduct due diligence.
146. Id. art. 2464.
147. “OVC” means “other valuable consideration.”
148. Id. art. 1969.
149. Id. art. 1970.
150. Great Sweet Grass Oils Co. v. Kroy-Am. Oils, Inc., 129 So. 2d 591, 594
(La. Ct. App. 1961).
151. See supra Part II.C; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:17 (2000).
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Rather, with the due diligence being conducted before the execution of the
PSA, the agreement merely obligates the purchaser to close the trade, pay
the purchase price, and purchase the assets. In this scenario, the purchaser
could also merely acquire the properties by way of a final assignment,
which actually conveys the assets, dispensing with a PSA. However, there
is often still a need for certain understandings between the parties, such as
indemnities, assumptions of obligations, transitional terms, etc., that the
parties might prefer to not place on record. If that is the case, the PSA will
embody those terms that are not spread across the public records, with the
recorded assignment effectuating the transfer of the assets from the seller
to the purchaser.152
In the former approach—involving the negotiation and execution of a
PSA followed by a period of time to conduct due diligence and take other
actions in anticipation of a closing—the PSA contains extensive
procedures and provisions to effectuate the transaction contemplated.
Although the length and scope of the PSA can vary greatly, depending on
the nature of the properties and the relative sophistication of the
contracting parties, the agreement will customarily contain an array of
provisions to address the transaction.
Limitations of space preclude a detailed, extensive consideration of all
of the types of provisions that might be included and are often encountered.
Rather, a few of the more consequential provisions will be considered in this
Part. In addition, an enumeration of provisions that might be contained in a
more sophisticated, comprehensively constructed purchase and sale
agreement of producing properties is found in the Appendix to this
Article.153
A. Definitions
The more sophisticated form of PSA will include a section containing
a detailed definition of terms. In turn, these terms are employed throughout
the PSA for consistency and ease of interpretation. For example, an
important definition that permeates the agreement is the term “Effective
Date,” or “Effective Time,” of the agreement.154 The fixing of the Effective
152. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2442 (“The parties to an act of sale or promise of
sale of immovable property are bound from the time the act is made, but such an
act is not effective against third parties until it is filed for registry according to the
laws of registry.”).
153. See infra Appendix I.
154. The “Effective Date” or “Time” is usually the first day of some calendar
month, at 7:00 A.M. Although now perhaps more a matter of lore than reality, the
custom of the industry has historically been that production is gauged at that time
of day.
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Date promotes several important purposes, not the least of which is setting
the anticipated demarcation point of ownership between the seller and the
purchaser for purposes of cost responsibility and revenue entitlement. A
number of other terms are important to define in the PSA, including
perhaps most importantly the “Property” that is the object of the sale, and
the “Purchase Price.”
B. Property and Purchase Price
Customarily, the initial portion of the PSA is devoted to an explanation
of the essential provisions of the proposed sale. The essential provisions
of the PSA, as with any sale under Louisiana Civil Code article 2439,
involve the “thing” that constitutes the object of the contract of sale and
the “price” to be paid by the vendee.155 As a result, the PSA will contain
clauses that provide both for a statement of the assets to be sold and for a
statement of the preliminary purchase price.
1. Identification of Assets to be Sold and to be Excluded
The heart of the agreement is the list of the assets to be conveyed.
Utilizing defined terms to encompass the categories and types of property
subject to the PSA and attached exhibits for greater specificity, the
agreement generally contemplates the following types of property as being
subject to the PSA: (a) mineral leases, including amendments, ratifications
or corrections; (b) other operational contracts, such as farm-in or farm-out
agreements, voluntary unit agreements, disposal agreements, and pipeline
agreements; (c) servitudes, surface leases, rights-of-way, and licenses
associated with, or dedicated to the use or operation of, the mineral leases;
(d) hydrocarbons produced subsequent to the Effective Date of the PSA;
(e) wells and equipment located on the lands covered by the mineral
leases; and (f) books and records owned by the seller in connection with
the assets to be conveyed. This is simply an enumeration of the essential
assets that the parties typically contemplate to convey. Other particular
properties can be listed in accordance with the parties’ agreement.
Of equal importance to an identification of the assets that are being
conveyed is a statement of those assets of the seller that are not subject to
the transaction and that the seller will retain. These are usually called
“Excluded Assets” and might be defined as including the following types
of property, by way of illustration only: (a) all audit rights and other rights
and choses in action arising, occurring, or existing in favor of seller before
155. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2439; see also id. art. 2623 (“A contract to sell must
set forth the thing and the price . . . .”).
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the Effective Date, or arising out of the operation of or production from the
Oil and Gas Properties before the Effective Date, which include, but are not
limited to, any and all contract rights, claims, receivables, revenues,
recoupment rights, recovery rights, accounting adjustments, mispayments,
erroneous payments or other claims of any nature in favor of seller and
relating to and accruing any time period before the Effective Date; (b) any
accounts receivable or payable accruing before the Effective Date; (c) all
corporate, partnership, financial, tax and legal records of seller, other than
title; (d) all hydrocarbon production from or attributable to the Properties
with respect to all periods before the Effective Date, and all proceeds
attributable thereto; (e) all claims for refunds of costs, taxes or expenses
borne by seller attributable to the period before the Effective Date; (f) all
deposits, cash, checks, funds and accounts receivable or received
attributable to seller’s interests in the Properties with respect to any period
of time before the Effective Date; (g) all computer or communications
equipment and software or intellectual property—including tapes, data
and program documentation, and all tangible manifestations and technical
information relating thereto and the GEPX Accounting System—owned,
licensed, or used by seller, except that purchaser shall be entitled to receive
data related to accounting with third parties as specified in the agreement;
(h) any logo, service mark, copyright, trade name, or trademark of or
associated with seller or any affiliate of seller or any business of seller or
an affiliate; (i) all interpreted geological and geophysical data that cannot
be transferred without the consent of or payment to any third party; (j) all
vehicles and vessels; and (k) any documents withheld or not transferred
pursuant to the agreement, including any files, records, information, or
data to the extent that seller is prevented from disclosing or transferring
such property to purchaser.
The import and effect of the “Excluded Assets” provision of a PSA
was at issue in a case arising out of Texas.156 That case involved oil and
gas assets located on the Outer Continental Shelf, situated off of the coast
of California.157 Plains successfully sued the Federal government after it
repudiated certain leases, with Plains recovering more than $83 million.158
In this case, the court explained the factual underpinning of the suit,
as follows:
At issue is the proper construction of a 1996 purchase and sale
agreement in which Torch Energy Advisors Inc. sold its leasehold
156. Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors Inc., No. 13–
0597, 2015 WL 3653330, at *5 (Tex. June 12, 2015).
157. Id. at *1–2.
158. Id. at *4.
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interests in undeveloped oil and gas fields located outside territorial
waters off the coast of California. Certain tangible and intangible
interests were excluded from the conveyance on terms described in
the purchase and sale agreement. More than a decade later, a federal
court determined that the federal government had repudiated the
mineral leases because a statute enacted several years before the
conveyance had later been applied in a manner that precluded
development of the leasehold interests. As a result, the purchaser’s
successor in interest, Plains Exploration & Production Company,
was awarded restitution of the lease-bonus payments Torch’s
predecessor had paid to secure the leases. Although not a party to
the litigation, Torch claimed an ownership interest in roughly half
the judgment based on the terms of the excluded-assets provision in
the 1996 agreement. When Plains declined to pay, Torch sued,
alleging various contract, tort, and equitable theories of recovery.159
Torch contended that it was entitled to share in Plains’ recovery because
the monies so obtained allegedly came within the ambit of an “Excluded
Asset” retained by Torch in the 1996 PSA.160 The clause on which Torch
relied read, as follows:
§ 1.2. Excluded Assets. As used herein, “Excluded Assets” means . . .
(b) all claims and causes of action of [Torch] (i) arising from acts,
omissions or events, or damage to or destruction of property, occurring
prior to the Effective Date, (ii) arising under or with respect to any of
the Contracts that are attributable to periods of time prior to the
Effective Date (including claims for adjustments or refunds); . . . (g) all
proceeds, income or revenues (and any security or other deposits
made) attributable to (i) the Properties for any period prior to the
Effective Date, or (ii) any Excluded Assets . . . .161
Torch argued that “these provisions reserve any future benefit of
monies spent or actions taken pre-conveyance with respect to the leases,
while the contract otherwise conveyed all future production benefits to
Plains.”162 Rejecting this contention, the court held as follows:
Viewing the contract as reserving, in perpetuity, any claim, cause
of action, or resulting judgment that could ever be asserted under
159. Id. at *1.
160. Id. at *5.
161. Id. at *6 (quoting the Agreement to Purchase and Sale between the parties
to the lawsuit).
162. Id. at *9.
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laws in existence at the time of the conveyance is not a reasonable
construction of the excluded-assets provision.
Because the proceeds of the Amber judgment are neither attributable
to nor arising from or with respect to pre-conveyance events, they are
not excluded assets within the meaning of sections 1.2(b)(i),
1.2(b)(ii), and 1.2(g) of the 1996 PSA. Torch therefore has no claim
to any portion of the judgment.163
The “take-away” from this case is that great care must be taken in
defining terms employed in the PSA and in understanding the import and
interplay between these terms.
2. Preliminary Purchase Price
The parties will stipulate the base, or preliminary, purchase price to be
paid by the purchaser for the assets being sold by the seller. This statement
of monetary consideration is necessarily preliminary because it is subject
to adjustment, either upward or downward, depending on a variety of
reasons, all specified in the parties’ agreement.164 Starting with the
Preliminary Purchase Price, the process that the PSA envisions should
conclude with a fixed and determined Final Purchase Price, thus satisfying
the codal requirement that the “price must be fixed by the parties in a sum
either certain or determinable through a method agreed by them.”165
3. Deposit
Depending on a variety of issues—not the least of which is the
magnitude of the transaction in terms of the amount of the purchase price,
as well the prior history between the parties—the PSA may require that
the purchaser post a deposit, perhaps 10% of the purchase price, to ensure
the purchaser’s performance under the agreement. The disposition of the
deposit should be addressed in the PSA, both as to the circumstance when
the closing occurs or does not occur.
The concept of earnest money has been held applicable to a transaction
involving oil and gas leases.166 The default nature of a deposit under
Louisiana law, however, has changed since the repeal of Louisiana Civil
163. Id. at *11.
164. For a discussion of the circumstances giving rise to an adjustment of the
purchase price, see supra Part IV.B.4.
165. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2464 (2015).
166. See Baird v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 947, 949 (W.D. La. 1933), aff’d,
65 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1933).
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Code article 2463,167 which provided: “[I]f the promise to sell has been
made with the giving of earnest, each of the contracting parties is at liberty
to recede from the promise; to wit: he who has given the earnest, by
forfeiting it; and he who has received it, by returning the double.”168 Under
this law, money given as a deposit in connection with an agreement to
purchase and sell property was presumed to constitute earnest money
unless the parties negated the agreement being regarded as such.169 This
treatment of a deposit in connection with a contract to sell necessitated an
express statement that the money would not be “deemed” as earnest
money.170
Effective January 1, 1995, the provision concerning “earnest money”
is governed by Louisiana Civil Code article 2624, which establishes the
opposite presumption regarding deposits: “A sum given by the buyer to
the seller in connection with a contract to sell is regarded to be a deposit
on account of the price, unless the parties have expressly provided
otherwise.”171 Thus, under the new law, parties must stipulate that a sum
given to the seller is earnest money, in which case “either party may recede
from the contract, but the buyer who chooses to recede must forfeit the
earnest money, and the seller who so chooses must return the earnest
money plus an equal amount.”172 Further, article 2624 makes clear that
“[w]hen earnest money has been given and a party fails to perform for
reasons other than a fortuitous event, that party will be regarded as
receding from the contract.”173
4. Purchase Price Adjustments
It is also important to consider the conduct of “due diligence,” a
procedure or activity that affords the purchaser the opportunity to satisfy
itself that the seller validly owns what it states that it owns and that the
purchaser will be acquiring those assets that it intends to acquire for the
price to which the parties have agreed. If the conduct of due diligence
identifies defects in the title of the Assets, the environmental condition of
the property, or otherwise as contemplated by the PSA, the agreement
typically affords an opportunity to either terminate the agreement or adjust
the purchase price.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Act No. 841, 1993 La. Acts 2239.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2463 (1992).
Smith v. Hussey, 43 So. 902, 904–05 (La. 1907).
See id.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2624 (2015).
Id.
Id.
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One published report elucidates on the issue of the frequency of a
Purchase Price Adjustment resulting from the conduct of due diligence as
follows:
The November 2014 study from the David Eccles School of
Business at The University of Utah — Title Clean-Up Analysis
(by K. Bown, M. Dixon, J. Ingebritson and K. Rodriguez) —
analyzed approximately 5,600 leases and deeds from two fairly
large lease deals with dozens of predecessors. The four-person
research team expected the data to show that the net gains and
losses in acreage from title defects would even out. What they
discovered instead is that title defects are two times more likely to
result in a net loss than in a net gain in acreage. In their analysis
of 145 additional public transactions, the team revealed a lack of
organization, transparency, and accountability across the industry.
Of those 145 transactions, 48 listed both the original announced
price and the price at closing. Of those 48, one-half (23) had a
different price at closing.174
Many PSAs utilize a defined term “Defensible Title.” As that term is
not one typically used in the civil law, parties contracting in Louisiana
should change “Defensible Title” to “Merchantable Title,” or even
“Marketable Title.”175 This defined term embodies the standard against
which the quality and sufficiency of the title of the seller is to be evaluated,

174. Mikal E. Belicove, Taking the Guesswork Out of Oil and Gas Lease
Contracts, HART ENERGY (Feb. 12, 2015, 11:01 AM), http://www.oilandgasinvest
or.com/blog/taking-guesswork-out-oil-and-gas-lease-contracts-782881.
175. “Property has a merchantable title when it can be readily sold or
mortgaged in the ordinary course of business by reasonable persons familiar with
the facts and questions involved.” Young v. Stevens, 209 So. 2d 25, 27 (La. 1967);
accord Parker v. Machen, 567 So. 2d 739, 743 (La. Ct. App. 1990). Title is
unmerchantable when it is suggestive of litigation. See Hardtner v. Dixie Oil Co.,
113 So. 357, 358–59 (La. 1927). “The word ‘merchantable’ implies something
less than a perfect title and permits of defects which are not reasonably liable to
result in assault.” Langford Land Co. v. Dietzgen Corp., 352 So. 2d 386, 388 (La.
Ct. App. 1977) (quoting Roberts v. Medlock, 148 So. 474, 476 (La. Ct. App.
1933)); see also Schaub v. O’Quin, 38 So. 2d 63, 65 (La. 1948) (“The
purchaser . . . is entitled to receive a complete, valid, unclouded title; he cannot
be compelled to accept a title burdened with a claim having a substantial basis
and, therefore, which is suggestive of serious future litigation; his agreement
provided for the purchase only of the property, not the property plus a probable
law suit.”).
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particularly as to the quantification of the interests as represented by the
seller in the PSA.
If the conduct of title due diligence reveals any discrepancy in either
the Working Interest (“WI”) or Net Revenue Interest (“NRI”) as
represented by the seller, or other insufficiency in title, the question then
presented is whether it meets the definition of a “title defect” as articulated
in the PSA.176
If the due diligence conducted by the purchaser’s team discovers a
discrepancy that is in the favor of the seller, in that the calculated WI or
NRI is higher than the represented WI or NRI, that is a “title benefit” and
is subject to being declared to the seller in the same manner as a title defect.
An upward variance in the calculated decimal interest is a “title benefit,”
inuring to the benefit of the seller in that it increases its WI or NRI,
potentially leading to an increase in the purchase price.
Usually, any downward variance in the calculated decimal interest as
found by the due diligence effort, as contrasted with the represented
numbers, will meet the definition of “title defect.”177 Typically, a matter
would not be deemed to constitute a title defect if it is covered by the
definition of another defined term, such as “Permitted Liens” or “Permitted
Encumbrances.”178 An abbreviated listing of matters residing under the
ambit of the term employed in the PSA might include the following:
(a) defects or irregularities arising out of lack of corporate
authorization, or a variation in corporate name, unless Purchaser
provides affirmative evidence that such corporate action was not
authorized and results in another person’s superior claim of title to
the relevant Property;

176. WI is the undivided interest owned by a person or company in and to a
mineral lease. Costs and expenses of operation of a well are borne by the owners
of the working interest in and to the mineral lease on which the well is drilled, or
in the unit in which such well is located, in accordance with their respective
working interest. NRI is the proportionate part of revenue attributable to the WI,
after considering and excluded the royalty interest held by others.
177. As will be seen, however, that conclusion does not necessarily mean that
the defect is one that can be asserted.
178. Although it is common for a PSA to refer to “Permitted Liens,” properly
speaking, Louisiana law does not recognize the institution of “lien.” Rather, in the
Bayou State’s civil law, it is denominated as “privilege.” See Succession of
Benjamin, 2 So. 187, 188 (La. 1887) (“The term ‘lien’ is not used in our law as
significative of any particular sort of incumbrance. It is a legal term used generally
to signify any incumbrance on property, but, we may say, usually employed in
connection with privileges, and rarely with mortgages.”).
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(b) defects or irregularities that have been cured or remedied by
applicable statutes of limitation or statutes for prescription;
(c) defects or irregularities in the chain of title consisting of the
failure to recite marital status in documents or omissions of
heirship proceedings;
(d) defects or irregularities in title that, for a period of five years
or more, have not delayed or prevented Seller [or Seller’s
predecessor, if owned by Seller less than five years] from
receiving its Net Revenue Interest share of the proceeds of
production, or caused it to bear a share of expenses and costs
greater than its Working Interest share from any unit or well;
(e) defects or irregularities resulting from or related to probate
proceedings, or the lack thereof, which defects or irregularities
have been outstanding for five years or more;
(f) conventional rights of reassignment normally activated by an
intent to abandon or release a lease and requiring notice to the
holders of such rights, and any other defect or irregularity as
would normally be waived by persons engaged in the oil and gas
business when purchasing producing properties;
(g) lessor’s royalties, non-participating royalties, overriding
royalties, reversionary interests, and similar burdens upon,
measured by, or payable out of production if the net cumulative
effect of such burdens does not operate to reduce the Net
Revenue Interest of Seller in any well or unit to an amount less
than the Net Revenue Interest set forth on Schedule I for such
well or unit, and does not obligate Seller to bear a Working
Interest for such well or unit in any amount greater than the
Working Interest set forth on Schedule I for such well or unit
unless the Net Revenue Interest for such well or unit is greater
than the Net Revenue Interest set forth on Schedule I in the same
proportion as any increase in such Working Interest;179
(h) all applicable laws, and rights reserved to or vested in any
governmental authority (i) to control or regulate any Property in
any manner; (ii) by the terms of any right, power, franchise, grant,
license, or permit, or by any provision of law, to terminate such
right, power, franchise, grant, license, or permit; to purchase,
condemn, expropriate, or recapture; or to designate a purchaser of
179. It is customary to attach to the PSA a schedule or exhibit that identifies
the leases or wells being sold and setting forth the WI and NRI for each identified
property. If the represented WI or NRI is subject to potential change (increase or
decrease) because of any circumstance (e.g., a future “payout” event), that is also
reflected in the interest of disclosure and understanding.
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any Property; (iii) to use such Property in a manner that does not
materially impair the use of such Property for the purposes for
which it is currently owned and operated; and (iv) to enforce any
obligations or duties affecting any Property to any governmental
authority, with respect to any franchise, grant, license, or permit;
(i) rights of a common owner of any interest in rights-of-way or
easements currently held by Seller and such common owner as
tenants in common or through common ownership;
(j) easements, conditions, covenants, restrictions, servitudes,
permits, rights-of-way, surface leases and other rights in the
Properties, for the purpose of surface operations, roads, alleys,
highways, railways, pipelines, transmission lines, transportation
lines, distribution lines, power lines, telephone lines, removal of
timber, grazing, logging operations, canals, ditches, reservoirs,
and other like purposes, or for the joint or common use of real
estate, rights-of-way, facilities, and equipment that do not
materially impair the use, ownership, or operation of the
Properties as currently owned and operated;
(k) zoning and planning ordinances and municipal regulations;
(l) any encumbrance affecting the Properties that is discharged by
Seller at or prior to Closing; and
(m) the Leases, the Basic Documents, and all other liens, privileges,
charges, encumbrances, contracts, agreements, instruments,
obligations, defects, and irregularities affecting the Properties that
individually or in the aggregate are not such as to materially
interfere with the ownership, operation, or use of any of the
Properties as currently owned and operated, and do not reduce the
Net Revenue Interest of Seller in any well or unit to an amount
less than the Net Revenue Interest set forth on Schedule I for such
well or unit and do not obligate Seller to bear a Working Interest
for such well or unit in any amount greater than the Working
Interest set forth on Schedule I for such well or unit unless the Net
Revenue Interest for such Property is greater than the Net Revenue
Interest set forth on Schedule I in the same proportion as any
increase in such Working Interest.
The purchaser should carefully scrutinize the listing of “Permitted Liens”
as proposed by the seller and endeavor to eliminate those matters that
represent a risk that the purchaser is unwilling to assume.
Conversely, it is in the seller’s best interest to “load up” the
enumerated matters so that the purchaser cannot assert these circumstances
as a title defect at a later date. Indeed, if the seller is aware of a particular
matter that is arguably a title defect, but the issue has been lingering for a
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significant period of time without complaint, the seller will deem it
reasonable to let that sleeping dog lie, and avoid any possibility of
awakening that sleeping dog. By listing it as a “Permitted Lien,” the seller
is afforded the opportunity to bring the matter to the attention of the
purchaser before the PSA is signed, with the understanding that the matter
should be left alone.
Other defects not involving a variance in the calculated WI or NRI
could also be asserted as a title defect, if they meet the contractual
definition of that term. Examples would be a mineral lease affecting
community property that has been signed by one spouse only; subject to a
superior mortgage, which has not been subordinated; executed by a
succession representative for which court authority was not perfectly
obtained; for which an assignment from a prior record owner to the current
seller is unavailable, and so on. These illustrations are title defects and,
unless such defects are cured, they will negatively affect the calculation of
the WI and NRI. As a result, full realization of the WI and NRI as
represented by the seller in the PSA cannot be achieved.
The end product of the title due diligence effort is to declare or assert
these defects on or before the “Title Defect Notice Date,” as specified in
the PSA. This date is typically a reasonable number of days before the
closing date to afford a period of time for the seller to evaluate the asserted
title defect and either undertake to cure the defect or otherwise resolve it
as specified in the PSA.
The title defect notice typically requires certain specified information,
such as the following: (a) a description of the Asserted Defect and the
wells and/or units listed on Schedule I to which it relates, and all
supporting documentation reasonably necessary to fully describe the basis
for the Defect or, if the supporting documentation is contained in Seller’s
Files, sufficient information to enable Seller to expeditiously locate such
supporting documentation; (b) for each applicable well or unit, the size of
any variance from WI or NRI, which does or could result from such
Asserted Defect; and (c) the amount by which Purchaser would propose to
adjust the Base Purchase Price, which amount shall not exceed the
Allocated Amount of the Properties affected by such Asserted Defect.
Despite that a number of title defects have been identified as meeting
the definition of “title defect,” the agreement might specify either a “floor”
or a “ceiling” that must first be met before these defects can be validly
asserted. It might be provided that, for an identified defect to be
considered, it must meet a certain monetary threshold, typically called a
“basket.” For example, the agreement might provide that a defect having
a value of less than $50,000—or any other threshold amount to which the
parties might agree—is not to be considered. At the same time, the PSA
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may contemplate that otherwise eligible title defects will not be taken into
account unless and until, in the aggregate, the defects equal or exceed a
certain “threshold,” often stated as a percentage of the total preliminary
purchase price. An example of such a clause might read:
Notwithstanding the provisions set forth above, a Title Defect or
Title Benefit shall not result in an adjustment in the Preliminary
Purchase Price unless the aggregate net value of all Title Defects
and Title Benefits with respect to the Interests claimed by the
parties is greater than five percent (5%) of the Preliminary
Purchase Price (the “Threshold Amount”). In such event, the
Preliminary Purchase Price on the Closing shall be adjusted by the
aggregate net value of all Title Defects or Title Benefits.
Clarity can also be brought to this issue by a clause that might read, as
follows:
Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the Base
Purchase Price shall not be reduced pursuant to this Section,
unless and until the aggregate of all such reductions exceeds five
percent (5%) of the Base Purchase Price (which amount shall be a
threshold, not a deductible).
Care should be taken that the seller has no opportunity to “double dip,”
by effectuating a de minimis basket or threshold as well as a deductible.
By the same token, the defect amount asserted by a purchaser should be
regulated by a clause that provides that “any allowable defect amount shall
be determined and calculated without duplication of any cost or loss
asserted by way of any other allowable defect amount pertaining to the
same property.” Otherwise, one party or the other would be availing a
contractual right on a duplicative basis, resulting in an inequitable
adjustment upward or downward on the purchase price.
Upon timely receipt of notice of title defects meeting the threshold, if
any, the seller typically has a few options. Generally, at the election of the
seller, the PSA might provide that the seller can cure the defect, postpone
the closing, proceed to close while holding back the asset subject to the
asserted defect with a consequential reduction of the purchase price, or
terminate the agreement.
A downward adjustment to the purchase price—inuring to the benefit
of the purchaser—might arise for a variety of reasons. The amount of any
title defects, environmental defects, or the elimination of an asset by
reason of the exercise by a third party of a “pref right,” are the most typical
examples. A downward adjustment can also result from gas imbalances
for which the purchaser will have responsibility in the future. The purchase
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price might also be reduced by other circumstances to which the parties
agree in writing.
On the other hand, the purchase price might be increased by reason of
a title benefit discovered during the conduct of title due diligence. Also,
an upward adjustment might be caused by capital expenditures incurred
by the seller, but pertaining to activities conducted after the effective date
of the sale, and, thus, for which the purchaser would be responsible.
An adjustment, either upward or downward, might arise by reason of
the value of production revenues received by one party or the other, but
attributable to production accruing to the other party in reference to the
effective date of the transaction. A case in point can be found on reports
that Chesapeake filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which are available for public viewing.180 There, a disclosure is made as
to a PSA pertaining to the sale by Chesapeake to Southwestern Energy of
assets in the Marcellus and Utica Formations in Wetzel County, West
Virginia.181 The PSA reflected a purchase price greater than $5 million.182
Seemingly, a dispute arose as to the sufficiency or adequacy of title, and
resulted in a settlement of such matters in the amount of $400 billion by
way of a reduction of the purchase price.183
C. Due Diligence
A critical aspect of the purchase and sale of producing properties is
the conduct of due diligence. Long gone are the days—if they ever
existed—when caveat emptor was the prevailing model.184 Due diligence
refers to the conduct of such investigation and inspection of the assets as
is necessary or appropriate to allow the purchaser to become fully familiar
with the quality and sufficiency of the assets involved, and as to the range
of obligations inherent therein. The term “due diligence” is actually derived
from a provision in the Securities Act of 1933, which afforded a defense to
broker-dealers who were charged with inadequate or insufficient disclosure
to potential purchasers of offered securities.185 This important topic has

180. See Chesapeake Energy Corporation Annual Report [SEC Form 10-K]
(2014), available at https://www.nyse.com/quote/XNYS:CHK/sec.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. “Caveat emptor” means “let the buyer beware” in Latin. It connotes that
the seller is assuming no responsibility for the quality or sufficiency of its title,
leaving the matter to the buyer to satisfy itself with respect to such matters. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 252 (9th ed. 2009).
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2014).
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been the subject of excellent articles presented at the Institute on Mineral
Law.186
1. Purpose and Objective
The seller—and the purchaser, for that matter—in a PSA customarily
make certain representations and warranties, called by way of short hand
“reps and warranties.” Among these “reps and warranties” might be a
number of representations to the effect that the seller owns, perhaps
subject only to “Permitted Liens” or “Permitted Encumbrances,”187 the
working interest and net revenue interest set forth on a schedule to the
PSA. The question might be asked as to why these explicit representations
are not sufficient, and why, in view thereof, it is necessary to conduct due
diligence.
There are a number of reasons why the purchaser should not rely
solely on the seller’s “reps and warranties.” First, unless a robust due
diligence is undertaken, the purchaser is essentially taking the assets at
“face value,” on a caveat emptor or “as is” basis, without the knowledge
of particular defects or deficiencies that if known in advance of the
execution of a PSA, would lead to a refinement or expansion of “reps and
warranties” that the purchaser might seek to obtain from the seller. Next,
the “reps and warranties” of the seller are often qualified by a knowledge
qualifier—“to the best of seller’s knowledge”—or are limited, by
provisions in the PSA, as to the manner of enforcement of a claim for
breach of warranty. Some forms of PSA provide: “None of the
representations and warranties contained in this Agreement, or in any
certificate delivered at Closing shall survive the Closing and the delivery
of the Conveyance.” In lieu of this limitation, the PSA might provide that
the “reps and warranties” only survive for a stated period of time, even as
short as six months. Additionally, accepting the seller’s “reps and
warranties” as a sole basis to be comfortable as to title affords no
opportunity to adjust the purchase price based upon any discrepancy in the
WI and NRI numbers represented by the seller. Finally, by purchasing the
properties without the conduct of a robust due diligence, a purchaser
should always be concerned about the future ability of the seller to respond
to an indemnity demand based upon a title discrepancy discovered postclosing, particularly many years later. These reasons and others establish
186. See, e.g., Janin H. Jones & Mark E. Robinson, Due Diligence for the 90s
from the Land and Legal Perspectives, 42 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 1 (1995); Aaron
G. Carlson, Due Diligence in Oil and Gas Acquisitions, 54 ANN. INST. ON MIN.
L. 83 (2007).
187. See supra Part IV.B.4.
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that the conduct of a comprehensive due diligence effort is the prudent
course of action for the purchaser.
The due diligence that is typically conducted is performed by employees,
as well as outside landmen, abstracters, and other consultants. Once the due
diligence team is assembled, the next issue is to determine the manner in
which access to the seller’s records will be allowed. It is typical that, among
other covenants or undertakings made by the seller, it will covenant to
provide access to the business records for purposes of the conduct by the
purchaser of due diligence. Such access also is regulated by notions of
reasonableness, during business hours, and perhaps with a stated amount
of advance notice.
The seller might elect to place all relevant documents and files in a
“data room,” so as to control the review process, and thereby avoid a
“stranger” from “roaming” through its files. More currently, the practice
is to scan all records, and provide access in a “lock box” or virtual space,
via an assigned password. The “old fashioned” way is to permit the
purchaser’s team of landmen and other consultants to visit the office of the
seller and examine the relevant documents.
Due diligence basically falls into three principal categories: title,
environmental, and regulatory. Other investigatory efforts residing under
the moniker of due diligence would pertain to an examination of financial,
litigation, contractual, and insurance matters.
2. Title Due Diligence
In a sense, the prudence of conducting title due diligence is
reminiscent of that sage observation uttered by Hedley Lamarr—played
by Harvey Korman—in the classic movie, Blazing Saddles.188 This villain
planned to buy up land and resell it to the railroad.189 “Unfortunately,” he
says, “there is one thing standing between me and that property—the
rightful owners.”190 Due diligence has as its purpose, if anything, a
determination or confirmation that the seller is in fact the “rightful owner”
of the assets the PSA embraces.
To this end, the seller typically will attach to the PSA a schedule that
lists the assets to be conveyed, and sets forth a representation by the seller
of the working interest and net revenue interest associated with each
distinct property. The purchaser then allocates a portion of the total
purchase price to the properties described on the schedule of assets.
Although the purchaser typically undertakes to allocate the initial values,
188. BLAZING SADDLES (Warner Bros. 1974).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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carefully scrutinizing the values so assigned is in the interest of both
parties, as these allocated values have the potential to either increase or
decrease the purchase price in some instances.
Indeed, the allocation of the total purchase price serves two fundamental
purposes. First, in the event that a party holding a preferential right to
purchase as to a particular asset should exercise such right, the value
allocated to that property would fix the price to be paid by the “pref right”
holder, and the purchase price would be accordingly reduced. Next, in the
event of a title defect or title benefit, the purchase price would be adjusted
downward—in the event of a title defect—or upward—in the case of a title
benefit—based on the formula in the PSA.
Typically, the WI and NRI, which are set forth on a schedule and
constitute an express representation by the seller, relate to an identified
well or unit. Generally, the represented numbers are not broken out on a
lease-by-lease basis. This manner of attribution causes issues of translation
in that, by definition, working interest and net revenue are associated with
distinct mineral leases and, in the case of unit production, the numbers are
then aggregated to the unit or the well to which such mineral leases relate.
This means that, as a minimum, the due diligence team needs a copy
of all mineral leases and amendments, as well as any instruments creating
additional burdens on production affecting the subject leases, such as the
unit survey plat, and information from the Office of Conservation
confirming that the unit well is in fact perforated within the unitized
interval.
Additionally, the due diligence team would like to gain comfort from
reviewing division orders, if they exist, and royalty checks to show the
manner in which the royalties have been historically distributed by the
operator. With respect to the WI being conveyed, the team would want to
view JIB statements191 to confirm that the operator consistently recognized
the cost-bearing responsibility of the seller.
Also inherent in the title due diligence is the issue of “lease
maintenance,” that is, confirming that the mineral leases have, in fact, been
maintained in force and effect to a current date. This necessitates a review
of cancelled checks representing the payment of delay rentals, and
royalties. These lease payments constitute “rent,”192 and the failure to pay
such payments, or the improper payment thereof, would either result in the
termination of the lease—with respect to the nonpayment of delay

191. A “JIB statement” is a “joint interest billing statement,” which reflects
the percentage or decimal responsibility of each WI owner for costs in the unit or
lease in question.
192. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:123 (2000).
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rentals193—or the potential for lease dissolution or double royalties as
damages (as pertains to the nonpayment of royalties).194 This type of
historic information is not always available, particularly if the assets are
represented by mineral leases that are many years old.
Typically, the PSA includes a lease schedule, which lists all mineral
leases subject to the transaction. If the schedule indicates that any one or
more leases are limited as to subsurface depth—say, the lease is shown to
cover only “shallow rights,” or “deep rights” under the leased premises—
the title due diligence must at a minimum determine that the lease only
covers those depths. The purchaser must check whether seller is proposing
to convey the entirety of the interest covered by the mineral lease, or if
some third person owns—or perhaps the seller itself intends to reserve—
the non-described subsurface depth. If the mineral lease is determined to
cover all subsurface depth, but only the “shallow rights” or the “deep
rights” are being conveyed, inquiry should be made into the possibility
that the mineral lease has been or will be divided—a critical issue that
directly implicates lease maintenance.195
The due diligence team will also review the seller’s lease files to
discern if any demand by the lessor to correct an alleged breach of the
mineral leases has been or is currently pending, and how any such demand
or claim of breach has been resolved. It would not be usual that there is
ample time to obtain full abstracts of title covering title to the lands
affected by the mineral leases that are the subject to the transaction.
Typically, the due diligence team will attempt to identify and obtain any
existing title opinions and bring them current with respect to the interest
being conveyed. This is accomplished by sending abstracters or brokers to
the pertinent courthouses to examine the public records from the closing
date of any existing and available title opinions or abstracts to a current
date.
In that regard, one does not ordinarily “look behind” the title opinion,
nor spend any time or money in bringing them current with respect to an
interest not being purchased. The constraints of time usually disallow any
opportunity to verify all findings in the title opinion. Since the operator
has relied upon the findings of such opinions, presumably without
193. Id. at § 31:133.
194. Id. at §§ 31:137 to :142.
195. See generally Ottinger, What’s in a Name?, supra note 53. As a general
proposition, “lease division,” when it is presented, means that activities that would
maintain in force and effect one of the mineral leases, “would not result in the
perpetuation of the second lease because, in essence, they are now separate and
distinct leases, albeit each being regulated under the same contractual terms as
specified in the original lease document.” Id. at 309.
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complaint, relying on the findings of the opinion as expressed is
commercially reasonable. Reviewing each unsatisfied title opinion
requirement is necessary, however, to evaluate whether curative actions
are appropriate.196
With this information, the lawyer will examine the documentation
provided, in an attempt to verify the accuracy of the WI and NRI numbers
represented by the seller. If there is a discrepancy, it is to be identified, and
the lawyer should attempt to frame curative requirements, that is, those
actions that, if taken, will cure or rectify the discrepancy. If the
discrepancy cannot be clarified, it might give rise to a purchase price
adjustment or some other mode of resolution.
As critical as a review of the conveyance records is to the important
purpose of verifying that the interests owned by the seller have not been
alienated, examining the mortgage records to confirm that the seller’s
properties are not subject to any mortgage or privilege is equally as
important. Clearly, if that is the case, the purchaser will not want to acquire
the interests and then be subject to losing them at a judicial sale.
Purely as a practical matter, if a property has been producing for a
great period of time without complaint, and if nothing is revealed in an
examination of the seller’s files that suggests a precarious or tenuous
relationship with the lessor, some comfort might be gained from such fact
under the well-known theory of the “sleeping dog.”
Beyond the issue of title—as important as that is—the due diligence
team will endeavor to identify any restrictions on assignability or
preferential rights to purchase. The ability on the part of the seller to
convey the assets without restriction is directly contingent on a
confirmation that no such restrictions exist. If these restrictions exist,
abiding by the relevant provision, and then either seeking to obtain the
requisite consent or approval or a waiver, is necessary.197
A seller can be determined to have perfect title to the assets that are
subject to the PSA, but that determination is of little comfort if the seller
is not a validly created legal entity, lacking the capacity to own or convey
title.198 Thus, a subset of the title due diligence is confirmation that the
seller is a validly created legal entity in good standing with its state of
incorporation or organization, and of the state in which the assets are
located.

196. Further comfort might be gained by the mere passage of time, in reliance
on principles of acquisitive prescription.
197. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:126 to :128 (2000).
198. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 479 (2015).
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3. Environmental Due Diligence
In recent years, the topic of the environmental condition of the property
has become an issue of paramount interest to the purchaser. This is
particularly so if the agreement envisions that the purchaser must undertake
remediation efforts or indemnify the seller in reference to the condition of
the lands covered by leases.
a. Scope
Since the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Corbello v. Iowa
Production,199 and the spate of litigation resulting therefrom, it is imperative
that the purchaser conduct at least a cursory inspection of the property, as
well as the records of the seller, to ascertain that the environmental condition
of the property is not such as to result in a lawsuit seeking damages for
failure to remediate the land.200
A site visit by engineers and consultants is essential to clearly
understand the nature, placement, configuration, and condition of
equipment located on the property. This important effort constitutes an
environmental site assessment (“ESA”), and these studies are categorized in
“phases.”201
More specifically, a Phase I ESA is the more superficial, and does not
typically entail actual sampling of soil, air, or groundwater.202 The more
intrusive ESA is the Phase II ESA, which actually involves the collection
and analysis of soil and groundwater samples.203 The Environmental
Protection Agency has promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to these
investigations, matters that, although of critical importance, are beyond the
scope of this paper.204

199. 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003), reh’g granted in part, 850 So. 2d 714 (La.
2003); see also Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 851 So. 2d 1253 (La. Ct. App. 2003)
(judgment rendered on remand).
200. See Susan G. Zachos & Brenda L. Clayton, State of the Art of Negotiating
Environmental Issues in Energy Industry Purchase and Sale Agreements, 55 INST.
ON OIL & GAS L. 13-1 (2004).
201. See Charles P. Efflandt, When the Tail Wags the Dog: Environmental
Considerations and Strategies in Business Acquisitions, Sales and Merger
Transactions, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 28, 43–44 (1999).
202. Id. at 43.
203. Id. at 44.
204. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 302–307 (2003).
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b. Regulatory Requirement
If any of these types of investigation are conducted, the parties must be
mindful of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29.1, which provides as
follows:
If the owner or operator of any oilfield site or exploration and
production (E&P) site covered by the provisions of R.S. 30:29
performs any environmental testing on land owned by another
person, results of such environmental testing shall be provided to
the owner or owners of the land within ten days from receipt of
such results by the owner or operator, regardless of whether or not
suit has been filed by the owner or owners of the land. The
operator or owner or owners of land or anyone acting on their
behalf who perform any environmental testing on land that is an
oilfield or exploration and production (E&P) site shall provide the
results of such testing to the department within ten days of
receipt.205
A variety of consulting firms might be contracted for this purpose. The
seller probably will insist that the purchaser assume all responsibilities to
remediate the property, and plug and abandon the wells. In contrast, the
purchaser will want to know the potential scope of this responsibility in
financial terms as best as they can be ascertained or estimated.
c. Site-Specific Trust Agreements
Additionally, major issues between parties to a sale of producing
properties include the environmental condition of the property, the
potential for future regulatory action by the Louisiana Office of
Conservation relative to the remediation of the property, and the plugging
and abandonment of inactive wells.206 As a general proposition, the
Commissioner of Conservation will seek enforcement against the current
operator of record.207 It has long been the policy of the Office of
Conservation, however, to seek enforcement against a prior owner or
205. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29.1 (2007).
206. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 101 (2011). For an illustration of the
problems that can be encountered as a consequence of a failure to properly plug
and abandon a well, see Magnolia Coal Terminal Co. v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So.
2d 475 (La. 1991).
207. See J. Patrick Batchelor, Comm’r of Conservation, La. Dep’t of Natural
Res., Memorandum, Enforcement Policy—Abandoned Wells and Pits (July 24,
1990).
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operator in the event the current operator cannot be located or is unable to
perform the necessary remedial activities.208
To be sure, the sale and assignment of the assets of which the field is
composed is no impediment to the Commissioner seeking performance
from a prior operator.209 Parties to the transfer of an oilfield site210 have the
opportunity to establish a site-specific trust account (“SSTA”) “for the
purpose of providing a source of funds for site restoration of that oilfield site
at such time in the future when restoration of that oilfield is required.”211 To
establish a site-specific trust account, a contractor approved by the Oilfield
Site Restoration Commission must conduct an oilfield site restoration
assessment.212 The parties must fund the account in accordance with a
funding schedule that the parties proposed and the Commission approved.213
Once the SSTA is approved and the account is fully funded, the party
transferring the oilfield site “shall not thereafter be held liable by the state
for any site restoration costs or actions associated with the transferred
oilfield site.”214 Instead, “[t]he party acquiring the oilfield site shall
thereafter be the responsible party.”215
Although the establishment of a site-specific trust account might
immunize the seller from regulatory responsibility, that in no manner
affects the right of the lessor to enforce private contractual rights against
a former owner. Indeed, the Louisiana Mineral Code unequivocally
instructs that “[a]n assignor or sublessor is not relieved of his obligations
or liabilities under a mineral lease unless the lessor has discharged him
expressly and in writing.”216

208. See Yuma Petroleum Co. v. Thompson, 731 So. 2d 190, 195 (La. 1999).
209. See id.
210. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(5) (2007) (“‘Oilfield site’ or ‘exploration
and production (E&P) site’ means any location or any portion thereof on which oil
or gas exploration, development, or production activities have occurred, including
wells, equipment, tanks, flow lines or impoundments used for the purposes of the
drilling, workover, production, primary separation, disposal, transportation or
storage of E&P wastes, crude oil and natural gas processing, transportation or
storage of a common production stream of crude oil, natural gas, coal seam natural
gas, or geothermal energy prior to a custody transfer or a sales point. In general, this
definition would apply to all exploration and production operations located on the
same lease, unit or field.”).
211. Id. § 30:88(A).
212. Id. § 30:88(B).
213. Id. § 30:88(C).
214. Id. § 30:88(F).
215. Id.
216. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:129 (2000).
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4. Regulatory Due Diligence
The seller might convey to the purchaser perfect title to the assets
subject to the PSA. Further, there may be no significant environmental
exposure disclosed by the purchaser’s environmental due diligence. But
this is of little comfort if the purchaser cannot operate the assets by reason
of deficiencies in the suite of necessary permits and licenses that the
operator is, by law, required to hold to lawfully operate the properties.
Thus, the purchaser should investigate the status of all permits, licenses
and other permissions that are required by law, whether federal, state, or
local.
a. Administrative
A range of governmental authorities—federal, state, or local—might
require some sort of permission to hold or operate oil and gas properties.
At the risk of failing to identify a particular agency or authority, one should
be mindful of certain commonly encountered issues. If any of the mineral
leases constituting the assets to be sold is one granted by the State of
Louisiana, through the State Mineral and Energy Board, it should be
confirmed that the assignor, as well as the anticipated assignee, is properly
registered as a “prospective leaseholder.”217 If the assets include leases on
the Outer Continental Shelf, under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, the purchaser should confirm that the seller—and,
eventually, the purchaser—is duly qualified to own or hold offshore
federal leases as required by applicable law.218 Most critically, due
diligence should verify that all wells are properly and currently authorized
by proper permits that the Louisiana Office of Conservation issued, and
that no compliance orders are outstanding or threatened with respect to
any such wells.

217. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:127A, :128A (Supp. 2015).
218. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012); 30 C.F.R. § 256.35 (2011) (“Mineral leases
issued pursuant to section 8 of the Act may be held only by: (1) Citizens and
nationals of the United States, (2) aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20); (3) private,
public or municipal corporations organized under the laws of the United States or
of any State or of the District of Columbia or territory thereof, or (4) associations
of such citizens, nationals, resident aliens, or private, public, or municipal
corporations, States, or political subdivisions of States.”).
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b. Regulatory
If the pertinent assets are geographically located such that they are
subject to the requirements of the State and Local Coastal Resources
Management Act of 1978,219 additional inquiries are applicable. Mineral
activities within the Coastal Zone, “including exploration for, and
production of, oil, gas, and other minerals, all dredge and fill uses associated
therewith, and all other associated uses,” constitute a “use of state concern”
and therefore are subject to the requirements of that regulatory scheme.220
The precise jurisdictional description of the Coastal Zone is set forth by
statute221 and on a map or chart available for public inspection in the offices
of the coastal management program of the Department of Natural Resources
and each local government in the Coastal Zone.222 But the Coastal Zone
jurisdiction may generally be considered as all lands lying south of the
Intracoastal Canal on the Western side of the state and south of Interstate
Highway 10 on the Eastern side of the state.223
No person may commence a use of state or local concern without first
applying for and receiving a coastal use permit.224 The regulations
pertaining to such applications and permits are quite extensive and have
been the subject of litigation.225 Efforts should be made to ascertain that all
necessary permits are in hand relative to any activity in the Coastal Zone.
A variety of permits are necessary for certain types of equipment that
might be used in connection with the exploration and production (“E&P”)
activities of the seller, for which it is necessary to obtain permits for their
operation. This includes—by way of example only—a permit that
establishes effluent limitations, prohibitions, reporting requirements, and
other requirements for discharges associated with oil and gas facilities.226
Additionally a permit is required to operate facilities that emit pollutants
into the atmosphere, typically called a “minor source air general
permit.”227 These permits are transferable upon compliance with notice
and other requirements by the issuing agency.228

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.21 to :214.42 (2012).
Id. § 49:214.25.
Id. § 49:214.24C.
Id. § 49:214.24D.
Id.
Id. § 49:214.30A(1).
See, e.g., Pardue v. Stephens, 558 So. 2d 1149 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, pt. III, § 513.A.2 (2007).
Id.
Id. pt. I, § 1907.
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5. Other Areas of Interest in the Conduct of Due Diligence
Although these categories—title, environmental, and regulatory—are
important, other topics should be considered, particularly in a large
transaction. These areas pertain to an examination of financial, litigation,
contractual, and insurance matters.
a. Financial
Under the moniker of financial due diligence, one would be concerned
with the performance of the producing assets as it relates to the revenue
stream to the operator from the production historically obtained over a
previous period of time. This entails a determination as to historic “lifting
costs,” prices received for the product being produced, existing marketing
contracts—particularly the term, price, and any provision for price
redetermination—and whether rates being paid under existing service
contracts are reasonable and competitive. Additionally, costs of bonds or
other forms of financial assurance, placed with a regulatory body or
landowner, or prior owner, must also be identified and understood. Tax
liabilities for any taxable asset should also be evaluated. The purchaser’s
chief financial officer, or other employees concerned with financial
matters, possess the critical skills needed to make these assessments.
b. Litigation
The pendency of any litigation affecting an asset should be
determined. Although this topic is often the subject of a specific
representation of the seller, the purchaser should “dig deeper” into the
topic so as to evaluate the potential that it would be joined to the suit, or
whether an adverse judgment would impede purchaser’s right to enjoy the
assets that it is purchasing. The purchaser should search the public records,
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particularly the mortgage records, to ascertain if a notice of lis pendens
has been filed.229
The rights of a purchaser to acquire property free and clear of claims
asserted in a lawsuit, if no notice of lis pendens has been filed, was
recognized in one case,230 where the court explained:
Inasmuch as the sale to the Majors was recorded in the public
records of Catahoula Parish prior to the filing of plaintiffs’ suit
and Notice of Lis Pendens, none of the matters alleged in
plaintiffs’ petition could affect the Majors. They are third parties
who have relied on the public records. No discussion of the well
established principles enunciated in these cases is necessary.231
For example, if a pending suit pertains to the title or ownership of, say,
a mineral lease, which is covered by the PSA, consideration should be
given as to whether the other party to the litigation could exercise the right
to redeem the asset under the doctrine of the sale of litigious rights—i.e.,
rights that are “contested in a suit already filed.”232 Under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2652:
When a litigious right is assigned, the debtor may extinguish his
obligation by paying to the assignee the price the assignee paid for
the assignment, with interest from the time of the assignment. . . .

229. Regulations concerning a notice of lis pendens are found in the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3751 (2003) (“The
pendency of an action or proceeding in any court, state or federal, in this state
affecting the title to, or asserting a mortgage or privilege on, immovable property
does not constitute notice to a third person not a party thereto unless a notice of
the pendency of the action or proceeding is made, and filed or recorded, as
required by Article 3752.”); id. art. 3752 (Supp. 2015) (“A. The notice referred to
in Article 3751 shall be in writing, signed by the plaintiff, defendant, or other
party to the action or proceeding who desires to have the notice recorded, or by a
counsel of record for such party showing the name of the persons against whom
it is to be effective, the name of the court in which the action or proceeding has
been filed, the title, docket number, date of filing, and object thereof, and the
description of the property sought to be affected thereby. B. This notice shall be
recorded in the mortgage office of the parish where the property to be affected is
situated and has effect from the time of the filing for recordation. The notice shall
cease to have effect after ten years from the date of its filing for recordation.
Nevertheless, if the action or proceeding is still pending, the notice may be
reinscribed by refiling the notice. A reinscription of the notice that is filed before
the effect of recordation ceases continues that effect for five years from the day
the notice is reinscribed.”).
230. Succession of Wilson v. Wilson, 446 So. 2d 526 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
231. Id. at 529 (citations omitted).
232. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2652 (2015).
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Nevertheless, the debtor may not thus extinguish his obligation
when the assignment has been made to a co-owner of the assigned
right, or to a possessor of the thing subject to the litigious right.233
c. Contractual
An assessment should be made as to the contracts in place for the
administration or operation of the properties in order to understand future
or potential cost liability. The purchaser would want to know if any
contract would result in the future disruption or reduction of the seller’s
right to receive proceeds of production. These issues arise in the event that
there is a “payout” arrangement being tracked, or future gas balancing
responsibilities in the event of a split-stream marketing arrangement.234
The importance of determining the existence of any imbalance in gas
production was demonstrated by the case of Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. Wapiti
Energy, L.L.C.235 Petro-Hunt entered into an agreement to sell certain
properties to Wapiti.236 In its PSA, Petro-Hunt represented to the purchaser
that it had no knowledge of any production imbalance.237 The agreement
further provided that the seller would deliver to purchaser a proposed final
settlement statement within 60 days after closing.238
After closing, but before the delivery of the final settlement statement,
“Petro-Hunt became aware that its representation and warranty that there
were no production imbalances in the relevant interests was not true.”239 It
acknowledged this fact in the statement, which it delivered to the

233. Id.
234. “Payout” is the point in time at which the owners of the working interest
in and to a well have recovered out of production attributable to their interests, the
entirety of the costs and expenses incurred in the drilling, completion, equipping
and operating of the well. At that point, it often occurs that a third party is entitled
to receive an interest in production, such that the NRI of the working interest
owners will be diminished accordingly.
A “split-stream marketing arrangement” is presented when working
interest owners are marketing their share of production separate and apart from
any other working interest owner. If a particular owner fails to market its share in
a particular month, production imbalances occur, a matter discussed in the next
case.
235. No. 01-10-01030-CV, 2012 WL 761144 (Tex. App. Mar. 8, 2012).
236. Id. at *1.
237. Id. The parties also agreed that “[a]ll representations and warranties set forth
in this Agreement . . . shall survive for a period of twelve (12) months following
Closing.” Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at *2.
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purchaser.240 The parties agreed that they did not have sufficient
information to resolve this imbalance, and thus, that “[s]ettlement for the
gas imbalances will be made as soon as the amounts are known and
mechanics of settlement can be agreed upon by the Parties.”241 The parties
settled on all other aspects of the transaction as covered by the final
settlement.242
Wapiti sought and obtained information from the operator,
ExxonMobil, with respect to the gas imbalance, and informed Petro-Hunt
that it was owed $349,730.243 Petro-Hunt responded that it “refused to pay
Wapiti for the gas imbalance.”244 After filing suit, Wapiti obtained a
summary judgment on liability.245 A trial was held to determine
damages.246 The court awarded Wapiti $424,811.80 in actual damages and
$318,113 in attorneys’ fees, plus additional fees for the defense of the
judgment on appeal.247
On appeal, Petro-Hunt argued that the parties’ purchase and sale
agreement required the concurrence of the parties on the post-closing
amounts: “Without such agreement, under the terms of the [PSA], the postclosing amounts were not due. Petro-Hunt argued that no agreement was
possible, because the amount of the imbalance, if any, was not known.”248
The court rejected this point of error, finding that the evidence supported
the existence of the imbalance.249
Petro-Hunt next urged that “the trial court improperly calculated
damages by valuing the entire imbalance as of the gas value on a single
day.”250 The court rejected this argument, finding that the testimony was
“legally sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that the value
of the production imbalance should have been based on the value of gas
on the closing date.”251
The purchaser must also identify any required consents to assign, or
other restriction on the free assignability of any particular asset that is the
subject of the PSA, specifically as it pertains to mineral leases. By the
same token, the existence of any preferential right to purchase must be
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *10.
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identified and examined. If the seller is relying on agreements with
landowners—other than the lessor under a mineral lease—for access to any
well site, the seller should verify that all necessary contractual arrangements
are in place, in force and effect, not subject to a pending termination, and do
not contain unusual terms that would cause a disruption in production or
access to the property. Contractual commitments in the form of future
drilling obligations under a mineral lease, farm-in agreement, or proposal
for the conduct of a subsequent operation under an operating agreement,252
must be identified and quantified.
This phase of due diligence—an examination of extant contractual
arrangements—arguably overlaps with the conduct of title due diligence
insofar as it is necessary to review the mineral leases held by the seller. The
purpose of examining these critical contracts is to, first and foremost, verify
that they have been maintained in force and effect, and, secondly, to identify
any onerous or unusual terms. Particularly important is evaluating the
possibility that the lease has been “divided” by virtue of a prior partial
assignment, either vertical or horizontal—a consideration that is
important, but is also beyond the scope of this paper.253
d. Insurance
The cost and coverage that liability insurance affords must be
examined, particularly if these matters are required by either contract or
regulatory requirement.
D. Representations and Warranties
The PSA customarily contains certain basic representations of stated
fact and express warranties, provided both by the seller and the purchaser.
From the viewpoint of the purchaser, the statement of such “reps and
warranties,” while important and comforting, does not obviate the
necessity to conduct due diligence into the matters discussed above. Many
of the representations and warranties might be considered as mundane or
routine, such as statements as to the due organization of each party; the
authority of the person who serves as signatory for each party; that the
execution of transaction documents will not violate any pertinent law or
court order, or result in a default under any other agreement; and that the
PSA, and other documents, are valid, binding and enforceable. The
252. See generally Patrick S. Ottinger, Be Careful What You Ask For:
Subsequent Operations Under the Model Form Operating Agreement, 63 ANN.
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. 281 (2012).
253. See Ottinger, What’s in a Name?, supra note 53.
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agreement usually provides that such “reps and warranties” are valid and
accurate when first stated, and will also be true at closing.
1. Of the Seller
Beyond the basic “reps and warranties” noted above, the seller might
make specific statements as to certain matters and confirm that the matters
reflected on identified schedules attached to the PSA are true and
complete. Examples include the following: inclusion of schedules
describing and identifying pending litigation; consents and approvals
necessary to be obtained; preferential rights to purchase, which must be
respected; that all royalties and other interests in production have been
paid; and negating the fact that there are outstanding obligations—such as
AFE’s, cash calls, or well proposals—in excess of a stated amount of
money, for which purchaser will have responsibility.254
2. Of the Purchaser
The seller would expect the purchaser to make an explicit
representation that no litigation is pending or threatened which would
preclude the consummation of the transaction. Additionally, the seller
would be vitally interested in knowing, by way of a representation on the
part of the purchaser, that the latter has the funds to purchase the assets, or
has arranged financing for that purpose.
Particularly if the seller is unfamiliar with the purchaser, the seller
should seek certain representations having as their purpose the
disallowance of any opportunity on the part of the purchaser to rescind the
sale of the leases as being unregistered securities. Representations of this
type include assertions that the purchaser is purchasing the assets “for its
own account, and not with the intent to make a distribution in violation of
the Securities Act of 1933 as amended (and the rules and regulations

254. An “AFE” is an Authorization for Expenditure, a document issued by an
operator to a non-operator in which an estimate of the costs to drill a well (or
conduct some other activity) is set forth, and seeking the approval of the nonoperator to participate in the activity described therein, and to pay its share of the
estimated costs. A “cash call” is a demand by the operator, pursuant to a provision
in the operating agreement, for a non-operator to advance its share of costs
anticipated to be incurred in the next calendar month. A “well proposal” is a
proposal by a party (who may be a non-operator) to conduct some specified
operation, and calling upon all other parties to express their concurrence and
agreement to share in costs to be incurred in the operation.
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pertaining thereto),” or words to that effect.255 Another example of
representation would be that the purchaser is an experienced oil and gas
operator who is “able to evaluate the merits and risks of an investment in
the Properties,” and understands the risks associated therewith. Further,
that the purchaser “has made its own independent investigation of the
Properties to the extent necessary to evaluate the Properties,” could prove
to be a useful warranty in that it demonstrates that the purchaser is not an
innocent, unknowing, or unsophisticated business person.
One party or the other will often resist a particular representation or
warranty upon which the other party insists, unless that warranty is
qualified by a “knowledge qualifier.” This may mean, for example, that a
matter is stated “to the best knowledge of Seller,” which would mean the
actual knowledge of the personnel of the seller.
E. Covenants
Covenant means “a promise of a particularly solemn nature, made in
such a manner as to communicate its enduring character and the highest
commitment that the promise will be fulfilled.”256 Thus, a covenant is a
promise to do, or not do, something. When made in a PSA, the beneficiary
of the covenant is entitled to rely upon the other party’s promise in entering
the contractual relationship.
The word “covenant” appears in only five articles of the Civil Code,
none of which abide the understanding of the term as used in a purchase
and sale agreement.257 Oil and gas lessees are also familiar with the term
as used in reference to the so-called “implied covenants” of the lessee, but
even the source article for these important rules is void of that term.258
A covenant differs from a representation or warranty, on which the
other party is also anticipated to rely, in that the covenant is usually more
focused, perhaps less generalized, and is actionable to the extent that it
constitutes an explicit undertaking, directed to a particular matter or
interest. The PSA customarily contains covenants that precede the closing
255. See Jack D. Laird, The Sale of Fractional Interests in Oil, Gas and
Mineral Rights—When are They Considered Securities?, 43 INST. ON OIL & GAS
L. & TAX’N 6-1 (1992).
256. 1 THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 281 (Stephen
Michael Sheppard ed., 2012).
257. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 102, 103, 3099, 3106, 3180 (2015).
258. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:122 (2000) (“A mineral lessee is not under a
fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is bound to perform the contract in good
faith and to develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent
operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties may stipulate
what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.”).
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(“pre-closing covenants”), and those which endure after the closing occurs
(“post-closing covenants”).
1. Pre-Closing Covenants
As a promise by one party to the other, a covenant typically would be
stated as “Seller will” do something, or “Seller shall use its best efforts”
to cause something to happen. Before closing, a common covenant by the
seller would typically constitute a promise to the purchaser to permit the
latter to have access to the seller’s books and records for purposes of the
conduct of due diligence. Additionally, the seller may promise that the
purchaser will have the right to inspect the properties, which affords an
opportunity for the purchaser to evaluate the condition of the assets, verify
their actual existence, and become satisfied as to the value assigned to such
assets.
Another “pre-closing covenant” running from the seller to the
purchaser is to the effect that “Seller will continue the operation of the
Properties in the ordinary course of its business (or, where Seller is not the
operator of a Property, will continue its actions as a non-operator in the
ordinary course of its business).” An important covenant that goes along
with the duty to continue the operation of the properties is a covenant to
maintain in place, before closing, insurance and any government bonds. In
addition, because the seller is in the best position to do so, a typical
covenant would obligate the seller to “use reasonable efforts, consistent
with industry practices in transactions of this type, to identify, with respect
to all Oil and Gas Properties, the names and addresses of parties holding
the Preferential Rights or Consents identified on” a schedule or exhibit to
the PSA.
The important feature of the covenants that the seller puts forth to and
for the benefit of the purchaser is to ensure that, before closing, the
properties are maintained, administered, and operated in the same manner
as they have historically been, so that at closing, the purchaser is acquiring
the properties as they existed at the inception of the transaction to the
extent practicable.
2. Post-Closing Covenants
The PSA might impose further obligations on the parties even after
the transaction is consummated. Customary among these post-closing
covenants are the following: the preparation and completion of any postclosing adjustments; the payment of all sales taxes occasioned by the sale
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of the interests, if any are due and payable;259 and all documentary, filing
and recording fees required in connection with the filing and recording of
any types of conveyances; taking all actions necessary to effectuate the
transfer, including the filing of applications and notices with governmental
agencies; the removal of all lease and well signs indicating seller’s
ownership of the now-conveyed assets; and the delivery of all files and
records to the purchaser.
F. Termination Provisions
A matter of equal importance to both the seller and the purchaser is an
articulation of the circumstances under which a party may terminate the
agreement, with no further liability to the other. These provisions are
sometimes called “walkaways,” or “contractual outs.” A typical PSA sets
forth the following events or occurrences that give rise to a right of
termination by one party or the other: (a) a material, uncured breach by the
other party; (b) by mutual consent of the parties; (c) if the transaction has
not been closed by some stated date, despite the good faith exercise of
diligence of the parties; (d) if a certain monetary threshold has been met,
either in reference to a title defect or an environmental defect; or (e) if the
transaction cannot be closed by reason of a legal impediment, such as an
injunction or other statutory or regulatory impediment.
Typically, if the agreement terminates pursuant to one of these
circumstances, the parties will “walk away,” from each other. The PSA
will address the disposition of any deposit posted by the purchaser but will
not, however, release a party from liability for damages if its action or
inaction was the cause of the termination.
A party electing to terminate an agreement for the purchase and sale
of property must attempt to comply with the terms of the agreement as
they pertain to the manner in which termination is to be made effective.
For example, in one case,260 the court held that notice of termination
provided by e-mail was an insufficient dispatch of such notice, as the
agreement required the termination to be “in writing.”261 The court
rejected the argument that an electronic communication was authorized
and effective under the Louisiana Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,262
259. The transfer of assets in connection with a sale of producing oil and gas
assets is excluded from sales taxation, as it constitutes the isolated or occasional
sale of tangible personal property by a person not engaged in such business. See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:301(1), :301(10)(c), :303(B)(4) (2007 & Supp. 2015).
260. White v. Strange, 80 So. 3d 1189 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
261. Id. at 1193.
262. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2601 to :2620 (2005 & Supp. 2015).
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because that act only applies if the parties “agreed to conduct transactions
by electronic means.”263 That did not occur in this case, because “the box
that states ‘Seller authorized the authentication of his signature or of the
Purchaser’s by facsimile (fax) or e-mail’ was left unchecked.”264
If the PSA affords an opportunity for the purchaser to terminate the
agreement based upon the articulated findings of any due diligence, the
purchaser must comply with the requirements of such “contractual out.”
For example, in one case265 in which the agreement allowed the purchaser
to terminate the agreement following an inspection, the right of
termination was provided under the following terms:
Upon completion of Inspections, [purchaser] must provide [seller]
with a copy of all inspection reports, and recognizes that such
reports may be provided to others by [seller]. If [purchaser] is not
satisfied with the present condition of the property as reflected in
the Inspection reports, [purchaser] (1) may elect, in writing, to
terminate the agreement to purchase . . . .266
The purchaser, upon receipt of the inspection report, notified the seller of
its election to terminate the agreement but did not provide a copy of the
report to the seller as required.267 The court determined that “the trial
court’s factual determination that [purchaser] breached the Agreement was
not manifestly erroneous,” explaining as follows:
According to the Agreement’s inspection provision, if [purchaser]
was not satisfied with the condition of the property “as reflected
in the inspection reports,” he had the authority to terminate the
Agreement, as long as said report was provided to [seller]. The
trial court found that the “report does not state that the elevation
as reflected in the survey limits the purchaser’s use of the
property.” Thus, because the flood elevation survey/report simply
revealed the property’s elevation statistics, coupled with
[purchaser] failing to provide a copy of the document to [seller],

263. 80 So. 3d at 1192; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2605B(1) (providing that the
Act “applies only to transactions between parties, each of which has agreed to
conduct transactions by electronic means”).
264. 80 So. 3d at 1193.
265. 1100 S. Jefferson Davis Parkway, LLC v. Williams, 165 So. 3d 1211 (La.
Ct. App. 2015).
266. Id. at 1214.
267. Id. at 1216–17.
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it cannot be considered an inspection report as contemplated by
the Agreement.268
G. Allocation of Liability and the Associated Indemnities
In today’s environment, hardly any provision in a purchase and sale
agreement is more important than the clause addressing allocation of
liability and associated indemnities. One of the factors that might motivate
a party to divest a producing property is the concern of future liability to
plug and abandon wells, stemming from the potential of a “legacy lawsuit”
filed in respect of allegations that the property has not been properly
remediated.269
The conflicting interests of the seller and purchaser are obvious. The
seller will seek to pass along to the purchaser all responsibility for any and
all actions then pending, or to be instituted in the future, that seek damages
for the environmental condition of the property. The seller will likely want
to spell out this allocation of liability in the clearest of terms. In dire
contrast, the purchaser will seek to have the seller retain responsibility for
all potential damages caused by activities occurring before the effective
date. The purchaser has an equal interest in spelling out this allocation of
liability in the clearest of terms.
If the purchaser prevails in keeping the seller “on the hook” for preeffective date activities, the matter so identified will be characterized as a
“retained obligation,” for which seller alone remains responsible. If the
seller is successful in having the purchaser assume responsibility for preeffective date activities, the matter so identified will be characterized as an
“assumed obligation.” Even if the purchaser assumes the obligation,
however, the seller—as the assignor under the ultimate assignment—
remains responsible to the lessor.270 At the same time, the assignor may be

268. Id. at 1217.
269. “‘Legacy litigation’ refers to hundreds of cases filed by landowners
seeking damages from oil and gas exploration companies for alleged
environmental damage in the wake of this Court’s decision in Corbello v. Iowa
Production, [850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003)]. These types of actions are known as
‘legacy litigation’ because they often arise from operations conducted many
decades ago, leaving an unwanted ‘legacy’ in the form of actual or alleged
contamination.” Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 238 n.1 (La. 2010).
270. “An assignor or sublessor is not relieved of his obligations or liabilities
under a mineral lease unless the lessor has discharged him expressly and in
writing.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:129 (2000); see also Kleas v. Mayfield, 404
So. 2d 500 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
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relieved of liability to the Office of Conservation if the parties undertake
to establish a site-specific trust account.271
Regardless of how these matters play out, the environmental due
diligence conducted by the purchaser is of critical importance so that the
purchaser and seller might be informed of the condition of the property,
and the liabilities attached. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated:
“The rule of indemnity is founded upon the general obligation to repair the
damage caused by one’s fault and the moral maxim that ‘no one ought to
enrich himself at the expense of another.’”272
A “knock-for-knock” indemnity arrangement is one in which party A
promises to indemnify party B from liabilities associated with party A’s
activities—and those of its employees—and vice versa.273 In its simplest
form, this arrangement is purely bilateral, but it is common to add, by way
of definition, a reference to the representatives associated with each of the
parties, such as “party A, its contractors, subcontractors and consultants,
its directors, officers, employees and agents, and its parent, affiliated or
subsidiary companies.” One court characterized a “knock-for-knock”
indemnity agreement as one “whereby each party to the contract would
indemnify the other for claims brought by its employees or the employees
of subcontractors it hired.”274
The important topic of indemnity is well beyond the scope of this
Article, and is frequently litigated in the Bayou State’s oil patch.275 Critical
to the negotiating and drafting of an indemnity clause is the basis for the
undertaking. Is it based on commitments made by the parties, or purely on
the fault of a party? Does it contain a temporal feature as to when the
triggering event occurs?
The preparation of an effective indemnity provision requires a thorough
understanding of a variety of public policy considerations, many of which
involve legal limitations on the construction of language purporting to
require a party to indemnify another for the fault of that other, as well as
issues of clarity, “talismanic” language, and conspicuousness.276
271. See supra Part IV.C.3.c.
272. Ebinger v. Venus Constr. Corp., 65 So. 3d 1279, 1283 (La. 2011).
273. See Weathersby v. Conoco Oil Co., 752 F.2d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 1984).
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Noble Energy, Inc. v. Prospective Inv. & Trading Co., No. 09748, 2011 WL 6046623 (W.D. La. Dec. 5, 2011).
276. For excellent commentary on this important topic, see J. Jay Caraway,
Allocation of Contract and Tort Liability for P&A, Site Restoration and Related
Issues, 41 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 1 (1994), and Marilyn C. Maloney and John
Almy, Indemnity Agreements in Mergers and Acquisitions, CENTER AM. & INT’L
L., www.cailaw.org/institute-for-energy-law/onlineeducation/2014/mergers-andacquisitions.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2016).
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H. The Closing
The “closing” is the event that culminates the process that includes
due diligence and other matters. This event is the time and place at which
the transaction contemplated by the PSA is consummated.
1. Consummation of Transaction
At the closing, all relevant documents are signed and the purchaser
pays the purchase price, which occur to effectuate the intention of the
parties. The date, time, and place of the closing are set forth in the PSA
but are often rescheduled or revised to accommodate due diligence, to
make necessary calculations for purchase price adjustments, or to obtain
necessary consents or waivers of “pref rights.”
When all suspensive conditions—in the jargon of the common law,
“conditions precedent”—to the closing have been satisfied or waived by
the parties, the closing will take place. It certainly can be a face-to-face
meeting, but it is often accomplished in different cities by signing and
exchanging the relevant documents. Because most delays occur due to
banking delays associated with the wire transfer of the purchase price,
parties frequently “pre-close” the transaction the day before the actual
closing date, with all executed documents being held in trust pending
receipt by the seller of the purchase price.
Parties should also remain aware that they can obligate themselves to
fulfill the conditions necessary for the closing. In Ratcliff Development,
L.L.C. v. Ollie Lee Corp.,277 the parties’ PSA set a closing date of October
23, 2012, and further provided that the purchaser278 had an inspection
period after which the purchaser could notify the seller of any title
defects.279 Purchaser notified the seller, who then had a 90-day period of
time to cure any defects at its expense.280 When the seller failed to do so,
the purchaser sued for specific performance to enforce the contract.281
The seller defended by arguing “that the closing date as set forth in the
original contract of 23 October 2012 was the drop-dead date unless
excluded by mutual agreement of the parties pursuant to paragraph 17 of
the buy-sell agreement,” an argument that the court found “to be without
merit.”282
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

155 So. 3d 698 (La. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 704.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 703.
Id.
Id. at 704.
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of specific
performance, stating, as follows:
We therefore find that the trial court correctly interpreted the clear
terms of the Purchase Agreement. Upon Ollie Lee’s failure to cure
the title defect, Ratcliff had the option to seek specific
performance, which required Ollie Lee to complete the act of sale
under the terms of the Purchase Agreement. The trial court
correctly found that the remedy of specific performance was
appropriate based on the testimony and evidence presented at
trial.283
2. Preparation of Closing Documents
Before the actual closing, the parties consult with each other and often
prepare a closing checklist to assign responsibility to various parties for
the preparation and delivery of documents to be executed or delivered at
the closing. On some date before the closing, both the seller and the
purchaser prepare and approve a preliminary settlement statement. This
statement includes the several elements or components supporting the
calculation of the preliminary purchase price. Typically, the purchaser is
afforded a period of time before closing to review the statement and
propose any adjustments based upon information developed in its due
diligence to that point in time. If the parties agree to changes proposed by
the purchaser, the preliminary purchase price is adjusted accordingly. If
not, the parties might nevertheless use the purchase price proposed by the
seller, knowing that further adjustments can be made at a future date after
the closing.
3. Typical Closing Documents
An array of documents are typically executed at the closing. If the
seller is the operator of the properties being sold, the parties execute a
change-of-operator form to be filed with all applicable regulatory bodies.
In Louisiana, this is an Amended Permit to Drill, changed to reflect the
new operator.284 Parties also execute letters in lieu, simple letter form
agreements, which are directed to the purchaser of production, informing
it of the change in ownership—and thus the asset purchaser’s entitlement
to proceeds of production—as of the effective date of the transaction. The
letter usually ratifies any existing division order pertaining to the assets
283. Id. at 707–08.
284. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, §104A2 (2011).
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being sold,285 and also serves as the authority for the purchaser of
production to commence payment of the proceeds of production to the
purchaser of assets with respect to production obtained at and after the
effective date to which the parties have agreed. Additionally, if the seller’s
assets are subject to a mortgage or security agreement, the seller will
deliver appropriate releases of those encumbrances so that the assets
purchased are not burdened by those mortgages.
The parties typically exchange evidence of the authority of each
signatory to execute and deliver the closing documents. If the purchaser is
obligated, by way of the PSA, to take over and assume any outstanding
bonds, letters or credit, or other instruments of financial security or
performance, the seller will be provided replacement instruments so that
those instruments posted by seller will be released or cancelled. If, despite
the exercise of diligence, a certain requirement contained in the PSA has
not been achieved or satisfied by the date of the closing, parties might elect
to execute a letter agreement that extends the date by which such closing
condition must be accomplished, with a specified penalty for failure to
accomplish it by such extended date. Finally, the Assignment is the most
critical document to be executed, as reflects the change of ownership
resulting from the consummation of the transaction.
I. Post-Closing Adjustments
The purchase price paid at the closing is that amount reflected by the
preliminary settlement statement that might be adjusted at or before
closing based upon actual information available to the parties. At some
date after the closing—often as much as 90 or 180 days later—the seller
typically tenders to the purchaser a proposed final settlement statement,
which reflects changes necessary to “true up” the estimates contained in
the preliminary settlement statement, and reflects actual transactions that
contribute to either an increase or decrease in the purchase price.286 This
is called a “purchase price adjustment.”

285. A “division order” is an “instrument setting forth the proportional
ownership in oil or gas, or the value thereof, which division order is prepared after
examination of title and which is executed by the owners of the production or
other persons having authority to act on behalf of the owners thereof.” LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 31:138.1 (2000).
286. In the industry, to “true-up” is to refine the estimated number by taking
into consideration actual transactions so as to make current and accurate the value
at issue. See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 737
F.3d 966, 971 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Moreover, the undisputed evidence shows that the
parties’ course of performance indicates that they consistently made adjustments
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The transactions that contribute to an adjustment of the purchase price
might relate to the resolution of any title or environmental defect that was
not concluded before closing. Additionally, revenue and expenses, both
pre-closing and post-closing, are taken into consideration so as to reflect
actual, rather than merely estimated, amounts. Matters that are accounted
for by way of an adjustment to the purchase price customarily do not come
within the ambit of an indemnity owed by one party or the other because
the party has already received credit, or suffered a debit, with respect to
such matters.
J. Miscellaneous Provisions
The range of contractual stipulations that one might encounter in a
PSA is determined by the prior experience of the parties and is unlimited
in terms of the doctrine of “freedom of contract” enjoyed by such parties.
1. “Freedom of Contract”287
The doctrine of “freedom of contract” operates in connection with the
agreements associated with the purchase and sale of producing properties,
particularly the PSA, to allow parties to construct their own bargains by
including clauses specially crafted to accomplish their intentions. The
Louisiana Supreme Court describes the doctrine thus: “‘Freedom of
contract’ signifies that parties to an agreement have the right and power to
construct their own bargains. . . . In a free enterprise system, parties are
free to contract except for those instances where the government places
restrictions for reasons of public policy.”288 These statements are
necessary corollaries of the idea enunciated in Louisiana Civil Code article
1983, which informs that “[c]ontracts have the effect of law for the
parties.”289 At the same time, contracting parties are assured that they “are
free to contract for any object that is lawful, possible, and determined or
determinable.”290
Setting forth all of the unique or important clauses commonly
encountered in PSAs would be impossible. Indeed, the generous use of the
to the amount of payment due at a time after the contract payment date, to ‘trueup’ the actual Quality Bank adjustments from the estimated amounts.”).
287. Portions of this section constitute an adaptation of OTTINGER, supra note
12, ch. 2, pt. I.
288. La. Smoked Prods., Inc. v. Savoie’s Sausage & Food Prods., Inc., 696 So.
2d 1373, 1380–81 (La. 1997).
289. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2015).
290. Id. art. 1971.
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words typically or customarily, as set forth herein, should be understood
in the context of the doctrine of “freedom of contract,” which might, in a
proper case, operate to alter—or even exclude—the given clause. Even so,
mention of a few of the “typical” or “customary” provisions is warranted.
2. Material Adverse Effect Clause
An important clause often encountered in a PSA is the “Material
Adverse Effect Clause.” A clause of this type is an attempt by the parties
to anticipate extreme changes in circumstance that might permit a party to
withdraw from the contract or propose and effectuate a revision to the
terms of the PSA.
An example of such a provision might read, as follows:
“Material Adverse Effect” means any circumstance, change,
effect, condition, development, event or occurrence that has
resulted in, or would be reasonably likely to result in, a material
adverse effect on the value of the Assets, taken as a whole;
provided, however, none of the following circumstances, changes,
effects, conditions, developments, events or occurrences shall be
deemed to constitute, or shall be taken into account in determining
whether, a Material Adverse Effect has occurred or would be
reasonably likely to occur: (a) any changes in Hydrocarbon or
other commodity prices, or in general conditions in the industries
or markets in which Seller operates; (b) changes, events, effects,
or developments generally applicable to the oil and gas industry
in the State of Louisiana, or to the oil and gas industry as a whole;
(c) national or international political conditions, including any
engagement in hostilities, whether or not pursuant to the
declaration of a national emergency or war, or the occurrence of
any military, terrorist, or criminal attack; (d) changes in Law,
GAAP,291 or the interpretation thereof from and after the
291. “GAAP” is the acronym for “Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles;” it is often a defined term in a PSA, and might be stated as:
Generally accepted accounting principles, applied on a consistent basis, as
set forth in Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and/or in statements of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board and/or their respective successors
and which are applicable in the circumstances as of the date in question.
Accounting principles are applied on a “consistent basis” when the
accounting principles observed in a current period are comparable in all
material respects to those accounting principles applied in a preceding
period.
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Execution Date; (e) the announcement or pendency of this
Agreement, actions contemplated by this Agreement or the other
Transaction Documents, or the consummation of the transactions
contemplated hereby or thereby; (f) matters that will be reflected as
a downward adjustment in the determination of the Adjusted
Purchase Price as of the Closing Date; (g) changes or developments
in financial or securities markets, or the economy in general,
including any changes in currency exchanges rates, interest rates,
monetary policy, or inflation; (h) effects of weather, meteorological
events, natural disasters, or other acts of God; (i) actions or inaction
of Governmental Authorities; (j) any decrease in the market price
of any Party’s (or such Party’s parent’s) publicly traded equity
securities; (k) the downgrade in the rating of any debt or debt
securities of any Party (or such Party’s parent); (l) the effects of any
action or inaction by Seller or any Affiliate of Seller at the request
or direction of Purchaser; provided that actions or inactions taken
(or omitted to be taken, as applicable) with Purchaser’s consent
shall not be considered to be taken (or omitted to be taken, as
applicable) at the request or direction of Purchaser; (m) natural
declines in well performance or the results of Hydrocarbon reserves
or production from any Well; or (n) any matters set forth or
described in the Disclosure Schedules on the Execution Date, or
that Purchaser has knowledge prior to the Execution Date.
A more abbreviated example of such a clause might read: “There shall
occur no adverse material change to the Properties or Seller’s interest
therein from the date of this letter to Closing.” The meaning of this precise
provision was litigated in Esplanade Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Templeton Energy
Income Corp.292 After signing a letter agreement containing this clause
designated in the agreement as condition 4(c), Templeton, as purchaser,
refused to consummate the transaction, noting the recent drop in the price
of oil “had, in its opinion, ‘adversely affected’ the Properties and that
Templeton did not consider it ‘feasible’ to negotiate a definitive purchase
and sale agreement as required by the letter agreement.”293 The court
rejected this contention, and explained:
Nothing in the letter agreement itself hints of any other construction. Nor does the plain meaning of the words lead to absurd
consequences. The essential purpose of the price agreement was
to fix the value at which the trade would later be finalized. If
292. 889 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1989).
293. Id. at 623.
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increases or decreases in market value were to govern, the price
term would have been redundant. Therefore, Templeton’s attempt
to pour new content into the language of condition 4(c) in an effort
to avoid what market fluctuations caused to be an economically
unwise business decision is unavailing. We conclude that condition
precedent 4(c) was fulfilled.294
The lesson to be learned from Templeton is that the words selected by
the parties matter, and if the parties intended to allow the purchaser to
escape from its commitment to purchase, in the event of significant
changes in commodity prices, such intention should be explicitly set forth
in the “Material Adverse Effect Clause.”
3. Choice of Law
Finding that the parties have stipulated that the law of a state other
than Louisiana controls the relationship created by the PSA is not
uncommon. Parties frequently chose Texas law to control, particularly
where both parties are domiciled in Texas. Louisiana law states that
contracts in one state may be made with reference to the laws of another
state, so long as the law chosen has a significant relationship to the contract
or the parties.295 One court elaborated:
Traditionally, Louisiana courts have found that parties to a
contract may agree to have their contract controlled by the law of
a state other than their own, provided the terms of the contract are
not against the public policy of the state in which the contract is
to be performed.296
In Whitehurst v. James Noel Flying Services,297 the court stated as
follows:
It is well established that where the parties stipulate the state law
governing the contract, Louisiana conflict of laws principles
require that the stipulation be given effect, unless there is statutory
or jurisprudential law to the contrary or strong public policy
considerations justifying the refusal to honor the contract as
294. Id. at 624.
295. Davis v. Humble Oil Refining Co., 283 So. 2d 783 (La. Ct. App. 1973);
Wellcraft Marine, Inc. v. Dauterive, 482 So. 2d 1002 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
296. Walnut Equip. Leasing Co., Inc. v. Moreno, 643 So. 2d 327, 330 (La. Ct.
App. 1994).
297. 509 So. 2d 1035 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
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written. A choice of law provision in a contract is presumed valid
until it is proved invalid. The party seeking to prove such a
provision is invalid bears the burden of proof.298
The prerogative for the parties to invoke the law of a state other than
Louisiana—in which the mineral leases are located—to control their
relationship, is governed by the Civil Code. As a general rule, “an issue in
a case having contacts with other states is governed by the law of the state
whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not
applied to that issue.”299 Courts are directed to evaluate two factors when
determining which state’s law should govern under this general rule:
(1) the relationship of each state to the parties and the dispute; and
(2) the policies and needs of the interstate and international systems,
including the policies of upholding the justified expectations of
parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences that might
follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.300
Thus, the enforceability of the parties’ choice of governing law from
a state other than the Bayou State is determined on a mixture of facts and
policy considerations. The principal limitation on the application of the
law of a foreign state is that regimes of property law from the selected state
that are antagonistic or repugnant to Louisiana’s civil law tradition, will
not generally be enforced, while matters which are more procedural in
nature might be tolerated.

298. Id. at 1037 (citations omitted); see also Cont’l Eagle Corp. v. Tanner &
Co. Ginning, 663 So. 2d 205 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Lewis v. Townsend, 108 So. 3d
184 (La. Ct. App. 2012).
299. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2015). For conventional obligations specifically,
there are additional enumerated factors to consider:
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the
relevant policies of the involved states in the light of: (1) the pertinent
contacts of each state to the parties and the transaction, including the
place of negotiation, formation, and performance of the contract, the
location of the object of the contract, and the place of domicile, habitual
residence, or business of the parties; (2) the nature, type, and purpose of
the contract; and (3) the policies referred to in Article 3515, as well as
the policies of facilitating the orderly planning of transactions, of
promoting multistate commercial intercourse, and of protecting one
party from undue imposition by the other.
Id. art. 3537; see also id. art. 3540 (“All other issues of conventional obligations
are governed by the law expressly chosen or clearly relied upon by the parties,
except to the extent that law contravenes the public policy of the state whose law
would otherwise be applicable under Article 3537.”).
300. Id. art. 3515.
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In some cases, Louisiana law will govern the contract regardless of the
weighing of these factors or the intent of the parties. One exception to the
general rule applies to contracts involving real rights in immovables that are
located in Louisiana: “Real rights in immovables situated in this state are
governed by the law of this state. Real rights in immovables situated in
another state are governed by the law that would be applied by the courts of
that state.”301 Consequently, a PSA covering mineral leases corresponding
to land in Louisiana is governed by Louisiana law.
4. Forum Selection Clauses
A “forum selection clause” is a provision stipulating that any litigation
between the parties to a PSA must be filed and prosecuted in an identified
court in a stipulated parish or county. Some have expressed doubt as to the
validity of such clauses, as Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
44(A) clearly and unambiguously prohibits waiver of the Code’s venue
provisions in advance of the litigation.302 The appellate courts in Louisiana
have been inconsistent in the treatment of such clauses.303
In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,304 the United States Supreme
Court stated that “such clauses are prima facie valid and should be
enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be
‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”305
The Louisiana Supreme Court resolved the same issue in one case,306
declaring as follows:
Based on our review of the law, we find no reason for Louisiana
to deviate from the general rule set forth by the United States
Supreme Court that contractual forum selection clauses are prima
facie valid. We hold that such clauses should be enforced in
Louisiana unless the resisting party can “clearly show that
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause
was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching . . . [or that]
enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum
301. Id. art. 3535 (“Whether a thing is an immovable is determined according
to the substantive law of the state in which the thing is situated.”).
302. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 44(A) (2015).
303. Compare Thompson Tree & Spraying Serv., Inc. v White Spunner
Constr., Inc., 68 So. 3d 1142 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011), with Rising Res. Control,
Inc. v. KIE Commodities & Fin., L.L.C., 80 So. 3d 1217 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2011).
304. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
305. Id. at 10.
306. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. of La., 148 So. 3d
871 (La. 2014).
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in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial
decision.” This court has long recognized that the freedom to
contract is an important public policy.307
If the parties have incorporated an arbitration clause into their PSA,
however, this clause is ineffectual—except perhaps in relation to a suit to
confirm or vacate an award. In other words, an agreement to arbitration
would be enforced, rendering immaterial a conflicting selection of a forum
to resolve disputes through traditional litigation.308
V. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF THE PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT
Parties to a PSA must prepare for the possibility that the other party
may fail to perform its respective obligations under the contract. As a
bilateral contract,309 a PSA is susceptible of being breached by either party.
On the one hand, the seller might fail or refuse to complete the transaction
by refusing to close and execute the assignment. On the other hand, the
purchaser might wish to “walk away” from the transaction, refusing to pay
the purchase price. In any case, the law provides an array of remedies to
the party who seeks to either enforce the contract to sell or recover
damages resulting from the breach by the other party.310
A. Specific Performance
Specific performance is the remedy that would most fundamentally
place the parties in the position in which they anticipated to find themselves
had the parties fully performed. This remedy most perfectly achieves the
bargain sought by the parties, as embodied in their agreement.
Under Louisiana law, the general rule is that a party is entitled to the
remedy of specific performance.311 This idea is reflected in Louisiana Civil
Code article 2623, which provides: “[A contract to sell] gives either party
the right to demand specific performance.”312 Likewise, Louisiana Civil
307. Id. at 881 (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13).
308. See Univ. of La. Monroe Facilities, Inc., v. JPI Apartment Dev., L.P., 151
So. 3d 126, 132 (La. Ct. App. 2014), writ denied 158 So. 3d 818, 820 (La. 2015)
(“Louisiana law favors arbitration as a preferred method of alternative dispute
resolution.”).
309. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1908 (2015) (“A contract is bilateral . . . when the
parties obligate themselves reciprocally, so that the obligation of each party is
correlative to the obligation of the other.”).
310. See id. arts. 1989–2011 (providing for remedies for the breach of
conventional obligations generally).
311. Rutherford v. Impson, 366 So. 2d 944, 946 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
312. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2623.
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Code article 1986, provides more generally: “Upon an obligor’s failure to
perform an obligation to deliver a thing . . . or to execute an instrument,
the court shall grant specific performance plus damages for delay if the
oblige so demands.”313
Despite the general rule that parties are entitled to the remedy of specific
performance, the Louisiana Civil Code makes clear that a court has
discretion to deny such a remedy when doing so would be impracticable.314
Relying on this authority, Louisiana courts have limited the use of specific
performance in the context of a PSA under certain circumstances.
The Louisiana Supreme Court described the rationale behind the
limitations to the remedy of specific performance in the case of Lombardo
v. Deshotel,315 in which the court noted:
Above all others, the creditor enjoys the right to demand, insofar
as is practicable, the specific performance of the obligation. Here,
however, the distinction between obligations to do or not to do is
of great moment, since an obligation to give a thing is always
susceptible of forced execution—unless, of course, performance
has become impossible or impracticable—while this is not always
the case with an obligation to do, or one not to do, where the liberal
principle of modern law that prevents laying hands on a person to
force him physically to do something is always taken into
account.316
Thus, if “specific performance is impracticable or . . . the obligation the
obligor has failed to perform is an obligation to do,” a court may decide to
not grant specific performance, limiting the obligee’s remedy to
compensatory damages.317 In addition, in the context of a “take-or-pay”
case,318 a Louisiana court gave a more detailed account of potential
limitations on the obligee’s ability to demand specific performance: “An
obligee has a right to specific performance for breach of contract except
when it is impossible, greatly disproportionate in cost to the actual

313. Id. art. 1986 (emphasis added).
314. Id.
315. 647 So. 2d 1086 (La. 1994).
316. Id. at 1090 (citations omitted).
317. Id. at 1091 (citing as examples Louisiana Civil Code article 1986 cmt. b,
c (1984) and J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Northgate Mall, Inc., 404 So. 2d 896 (La.
1981)).
318. Pogo Producing Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 493 So. 2d 909, 919 (La.
Ct. App. 1986). In the interest of full disclosure, this Author represented the
plaintiff-producer in this case.
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damages caused, no longer in the creditor’s interest, or of substantial
negative effect upon the interest of third parties.”319
If a court finds that such limitations do not apply, the general rule will
govern and the aggrieved party will have a right to demand specific
performance. In such a case, the court will direct the breaching party to
perform a specific act and, in the case that party fails to comply, the court
“may direct the act to be done by the sheriff or some other person
appointed by the court, at the cost of the disobedient party, and with the
same effect as if done by the party.”320 However, it is important to note
that, if the act involves merely the transfer of ownership of an immovable,
the judgment is self-operative and thus the court will not need to direct a
third person to perform any set task.321
Closely associated with the remedy of specific performance is
Louisiana Civil Code article 1988, which provides that a “failure to
perform an obligation to execute an instrument gives the obligee the right
to a judgment that shall stand for the act.”322 Thus, a party to a PSA who
refuses to abide by a judgment of specific performance cannot, by its
disobedience, defeat the consummation of the transaction. Rather, the
obligee has the “right to a judgment that shall stand for the act.”323
Consequently, in Kinberger v Drouet,324 the court explained: “If the
plaintiff has the right to the title, it will be so decreed, and defendant . . .
will be condemned to sign the deed. If she refuses to sign, then the decree
will be the title.”325
A recent suit involving a failed purchase and sale transaction of
producing oil and gas properties in Louisiana provides insight into the
workings of a PSA and the remedy of specific performance. In J. B. Hanks
Co., Inc. v. Shore Oil Co.,326 the parties entered into a PSA for the transfer
of certain producing assets in Livingston Parish from Shore to Hanks.327
The parties entered into a confidentiality agreement, and then negotiated
and executed a PSA.328 The PSA provided for a closing to occur on
319. Id. at 919.
320. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2504 (2015).
321. Id. cmt. b.
322. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1988 (2015).
323. Id.
324. 90 So. 367 (La. 1922).
325. Id. at 372.
326. No. 97-00040-BAJ-SCR, 2014 WL 268689 (M.D. La. Jan. 23, 2014). As
explained, and in the interest of full disclosure, your Author served as a Special
Master in this case. Nothing is disclosed or discussed herein that is not embodied
in the court’s Ruling and Order.
327. Id. at *18.
328. Id. at *2.
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September 9, 1994.329 The Purchase Price for all of the assets was
originally set at $450,000.330
After conducting due diligence, the purchaser asserted, as a title
defect, the fact that the seller had not properly accounted to a particular
lessor for royalties in accordance with the terms of a mineral lease. The
seller disagreed that this constituted a “material defect[] in title, percentage
interest, or deficiency in the Documents discovered by Purchaser,”331 and
litigation ensued.
The court—in adopting the Report and Recommendation of the
Special Master—deemed “most important,” the fact that continued receipt
by the lessors under the relevant lease of royalties as calculated by Shore,
“viewed in the worst light . . . would probably result in the assessment of
monetary damages rather than dissolution of the Lease.”332 Dissolution of
a mineral lease for improper payment of royalties—assuming it was
improper—is a disfavored remedy.333
The court held that the assertion by the purchaser with respect to the
manner of payment of royalties under this lease did not meet the standards
of the PSA as constituting a “defect in title.”334 The court concluded that,
“in the absence of the timely assertion of a valid ‘defect in title,’ the PSA
confers options only upon the Seller, not the Purchaser.”335 The court
finally found that the purchaser had waived any defects not asserted:
Having not asserted, on or before the stipulated date (September
27, 1994), a valid “defect in title,” the Purchaser waived all defects
not asserted. At that point, the Purchaser was obligated to appear
at the Closing on the Closing Date and conclude the transaction
contemplated by the PSA. By failing to do so, the [court]
determines that Shore had no further obligation to convey the
Assets to the Purchaser.336
The case of Whitbeck v. Champagne337 involved an action seeking
specific performance to require a purchaser to consummate the transaction
329. Id.
330. Id. at *19. The Purchase Price was later reduced to $437,500.00, when a
third party exercised a “preferential right to purchase” a portion of the assets. Id. at
*2.
331. Id. at *3–5.
332. Id. at *11.
333. Id.
334. Id. at *13.
335. Id.
336. Id. at *14.
337. 149 So. 3d 372 (La. Ct. App. 2014).

770

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

contemplated by a PSA affecting residential properties.338 The agreement
afforded the purchaser an inspection period of 15 days to make all
inspections of the property.339 The purchaser availed itself of this right of
inspection but did not raise any concerns within the 15-day period.340 By
virtue of not raising any objections to the condition of the property, the
purchaser waived the right to complain about the condition.341
The parties set a closing date, but the purchaser informed the seller on
the morning of the closing that it would not close the transaction because
of information received from a third party that the home had a “mold and
mildew issue.”342 The seller, although not obligated to do so contractually,
gave the purchaser a further opportunity to “take whatever steps they
deemed necessary to satisfy themselves that the Big Lake home was free
of mold and mildew.”343 After the purchaser persisted in refusing to close
the transaction, the seller filed suit for specific performance.344 After
discovery was completed, the seller filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the court granted.345 The trial court said:
The Champagnes were given carte blanche to inspect the house by
the Whitbecks, who asserted all through this process that they had
nothing to hide. The Champagnes were free to take any measures
necessary to assure there were no mold or structural defect present
in the Big Lake house, including tearing out the sheetrock in the
bedroom in question, as recommended by their realtor. The
Champagnes failed to do so.346
The judgment of specific performance was affirmed on appeal, and
additional attorney’s fees were awarded to the sellers.347
In another recent case,348 the purchaser was entitled to specific
performance of the PSA, because inaction on the part of the seller to cure
the title to the property did not constitute the seller’s “reasonable inability
to deliver merchantable title within the time specified.”349 Specifically, the
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
2015).
349.

Id. at 375.
Id.
Id. at 376–77.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 386.
Ratcliff Dev., L.L.C. v. Ollie Lee Corp., 155 So. 3d 698 (La. Ct. App.
Id. at 707.
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purchaser was entitled to specific performance, because the seller failed to
comply with the terms of the PSA by failing to complete the monition
process and cure the title defect, after which the seller was entitled to
pursue the fulfillment of the agreement through a demand for specific
performance.350
B. Money Damages
Although specific performance is the preferred remedy for a breach of
a PSA, that remedy might not be available if, for example, the seller has
sold the property to a third person who is protected by the “public records
doctrine.”351 In such a case, the remedy of the purchaser might be one of
money damages.
1. Duty to Mitigate352
Although it is a defensive doctrine usually presented in a tort action, a
plaintiff is clearly obliged to exercise reasonable efforts to mitigate
damages where possible.353 The duty to mitigate originated judicially as a
“natural consequence of the principle stated in C.C. Art. 1903 (1870).”354
That duty is now codified in Louisiana Civil Code article 2002, which
provides, as follows: “An obligee must make reasonable efforts to mitigate
the damage caused by the obligor’s failure to perform. When an obligee
fails to make these efforts, the obligor may demand that the damages be
accordingly reduced.”355
This article adjusts the conflict of interests that would otherwise exist
when an obligee neglects to mitigate his damages and thereby exposes the
obligor to further liability for consequences of the obligor’s failure to
perform that were reasonably avoidable by the obligee. The purpose of the
codally imposed obligation of the obligee to take reasonable steps to
minimize its damages, has been explained by the Louisiana Supreme
Court,356 as follows:
The doctrine of mitigation of damages applies in this state. This
doctrine imposes on the injured person a duty to exercise
350. Id.
351. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3338 (2015).
352. Portions of this section constitute an adaptation of OTTINGER, supra note
12, ch. 13, pt. VI.
353. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2002.
354. Id. art. 2002 cmt. a.
355. Id. art. 2002.
356. Lombardo v. Deshotel, 647 So. 2d 1086, 1092 (La. 1994).
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reasonable diligence and ordinary care in attempting to minimize
his damages after the injury has been inflicted. The care and
diligence required of him is the same as that which would be used
by a man of ordinary prudence under like circumstances. He need
not make extraordinary efforts or do what is unreasonable or
impractical in his efforts to minimize the damages, but his efforts
to minimize them must be reasonable and in accordance with the
rules of common sense, good faith and fair dealing.357
2. Stipulated Damages
A stipulated damages clause—or a “penal clause”—is “designed to both
fix the damages caused by nonperformance of the principal obligation and
act as a constraint to encourage performance of that obligation.”358 Courts
have consistently held that “a stipulated damage clause fixes the amount of
all damages that may be recovered, and actual damages may not be
awarded.”359 Louisiana Civil Code article 2005, provides, as follows:
“Parties may stipulate the damages to be recovered in case of
nonperformance, defective performance, or delay in performance of an
obligation. That stipulation gives rise to a secondary obligation for the
purpose of enforcing the principal one.”360
In Utley-James of Louisiana, Inc. v. State, Division of Administration,361
the court described the stipulated damages clause, as follows: “Under
Louisiana law, a stipulated damages clause is designed to fix the measure of
damages in advance and to constrain the timely performance of the principal
obligation. No showing of pecuniary or other actual damage is required to
enforce the clause.”362 Another court has further explained: “Stipulated
damages may be modified by the court if they are so manifestly
unreasonable as to be contrary to public policy. Stipulated damages should
reasonably approximate the damages suffered by the obligee and not be
penal.”363
357. Aultman v. Rinicker, 416 So. 2d 641, 645 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (internal
citations omitted).
358. Phillippi v. Viguerie, 606 So. 2d 577, 579 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Heeb v. Codifer & Bonnabel, Inc., 110 So. 2d 178 (La. 1926)).
359. Grimsley v. Lenox, 643 So. 2d 203, 206 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (citing
Gremillion’s Heirs v. Rapides Parish Police, 493 So. 2d 584 (La. 1986); Rabin v.
Blazas, 537 So. 2d 221 (La. Ct. App. 1988)).
360. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2005.
361. 671 So. 2d 473 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
362. Id. at 476.
363. Carney v. Boles, 643 So. 2d 339, 343 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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C. Attorney’s Fees
The well-established rule in Louisiana is that one may not recover
attorney’s fees from a defendant, unless these fees are authorized by
contract or statute.364 A court has explained that “[a]n award of attorney
fees is a type of penalty imposed not to make the injured party whole, but
rather to discourage a particular activity on the part of the opposing
party.”365 Thus, for a party to recover attorney’s fees incurred as a
consequence of the breach of the other party to a PSA, that agreement must
include a contractual basis for the award of such fees.
D. Prescription
In Louisiana, the concept of “statute of limitations” is known as
liberative prescription. Article 3447 of the Louisiana Civil Code states that
“[l]iberative prescription is a mode of barring of actions as a result of
inaction for a period of time.”366 “The fundamental purpose of a
prescription statute is to afford security of mind to a defendant and protect
against a stale claim,”367 as well as “to afford a defendant economic and
psychological security if a cause of action is not pleaded timely, and to
protect the defendant from stale claims and the loss of relevant proof.”368
Louisiana jurisprudence is well settled that the “character the plaintiff has
given his action by his pleadings must govern us in determining the
prescription applicable to it.”369 Thus, depending on the nature of the claim
brought by a party to a PSA, the relevant prescriptive period is, generally
speaking, either five years or ten years.

364. See Chauvin v. La Hitte, 85 So. 2d 43, 43 (La. 1956) (“On numerous
occasions this court has said that ordinarily attorney’s fees are not assessable as
an item of damages unless provided for by law or contract.”); Hernandez v.
Harson, 111 So. 2d 320, 327 (La. 1959) (“It is well recognized in the jurisprudence
of this Court that as a general rule attorney’s fees are not allowed except where
authorized by statute or contract.”).
365. Langley v. Petro Star Corp. of La., 792 So. 2d 721, 723 (La. 2001).
366. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3447.
367. Merrit v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Edu. Fund, 639 So. 2d 881, 882 (La. Ct.
App. 1994).
368. Terrel v. Perkins, 704 So. 2d 35, 38 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
369. Fishbein v. State ex rel. La. Univ. Health Serv. Ctr., 898 So. 2d 1260,
1265 (La. 2005).
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1. Applicable Prescriptive Period
Before 2006, the prescriptive period to enforce a PSA, or assert a
breach thereunder, was ten years.370 In 2006, Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 9:5645 was enacted,371 which now provides a five-year
prescriptive period: “An action for the breach or other failure to perform a
contract for the sale, exchange, or other transfer of an immovable is
prescribed in five years.”372
2. Unreasonable Delay in Seeking Relief
Even though a period of five years exists to file a suit in respect of a
“breach or other failure to perform” a PSA,373 this does not mean that a
timely filed suit cannot be subject to dismissal on the merits, based upon
the dilatory conduct of one party. The courts have held that one who seeks
specific performance of an agreement to sell must institute his suit within
a reasonable time and before any material change affecting the interest of
the parties has taken place.374
For example, in Joffrion v. Gumbel,375 the Louisiana Supreme Court
summarized the general rules underlying specific performance of a
contract to sell land and stated the “well-recognized rule” as follows:
The general rule is that he who seeks performance of a contract
for the conveyance of land must show himself ready, desirous,
prompt, and eager to perform the contract on his part. Therefore
unreasonable delay in doing these acts which are to be done by
him will justify and require a denial of relief. No rule respecting
the length of delay which will be fatal to relief can be laid down,
for each case must depend on its peculiar circumstances.376

370. A PSA was subject to the general rule: “Unless otherwise provided by
legislation, a personal action is subject to a liberative prescription of ten years.”
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3499.
371. Act No. 701, 2006 La. Acts 2598, 2598–99.
372. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5645 (2007).
373. See id.
374. J.B. Hanks Co. v. Shore Oil Co., No. 97-000040-BAJ-SCR, 2014 WL
268698, at *29–30 (M.D. La. Jan. 23, 2014).
375. 48 So. 1007 (La. 1909).
376. Id. at 1012.
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The case of Schluter v. Gentilly Terrace Co.377 involved a dispute surrounding a bond for deed contract.378 The parties’ agreement stated that
the purchaser would be permitted to buy three lots for a sum of $1,800, to
be paid by an initial payment of $50 in cash, and 117 promissory notes for
the balance, payable monthly, on or before the first day of each month.379
The plaintiff alleged that he attempted to tender the total amount due by
him at the time on the deferred payments under the contract, and the
defendant refused to accept the tender and deliver to the plaintiff a deed.380
The court concluded that the plaintiff violated his bond for deed
contract with the defendant by failing to pay the monthly installment notes,
deeming the attempted tender made by the plaintiff both too late and
insufficient.381 More significantly, the court noted that the plaintiff refused
to make payments and persisted in the cancellation of his contract
acceptance, up until the date of his attempted tender, at which time the
value of the lots had increased.382 The court stated that the “[p]laintiff
cannot be permitted to play the role of ‘watchful waiting’ all of these years,
without performing his obligation, and to reap, at this late date, the benefit
of it in speculative values.”383 The court then quoted Joffrion to buttress
its holding.384
In yet another case,385 the plaintiff tendered a written offer to purchase
land to be held open for a limited duration.386 The offer included an offer
to purchase the land, “with ‘tools, stock, seed and feed’, and as ‘a walk out
proposition’, for the cash price of $5,000.”387 The offer stipulated that, if
the defendant’s title were found invalid or so defective that it could not be
validated within a reasonable time and at a reasonable expense, then the
contract would be null and void.388 The offer further stated that, if the
contract was accepted, the plaintiff would be required to pay the remaining
balance by a specified date, or it would be forfeited.389
The plaintiff in Goudeau v. Daigle filed an action over eight years
after the specific date upon which payment was due to “make good” on
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

114 So. 586 (La. 1927).
Id. at 586.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 587–88.
Id. at 588.
Id.
Goudeau v. Daigle, 37 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. La. 1941).
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the offer.390 The court held that the plaintiff plainly abandoned the contract
which he sought to revive.391 More significantly, the court articulated the
perceived unfairness that would result from a decision in the plaintiff’s
favor.392 The court stated:
Plaintiff can not fairly be permitted to press the claim that he now
seeks to urge against the present defendants. The continued
development of the Charenton oil field, which was brought in on
September 6, 1936—after LeBlanc’s death—suggests that the
[new] value now attaching to “the property of Mr. Paul LeBlanc,
East side Charenton” (as the offer to buy reads) in the mind of the
plaintiff (who alleges himself to now be a citizen of the State of
Texas) is probably a value entirely disassociated from that which
led him to make his “walk-out” offer to purchase, in 1931.393
This jurisprudentially recognized limitation on the right to sue for
specific performance is uniquely appropriate to the sale of producing oil
and gas properties, due to the speculative nature of such assets.394 As one
court noted:
The business of the exploration of minerals is highly speculative
and capital intensive. It involves the investment of hundreds of
thousands of dollars, and the activity is extremely price sensitive.
Economic fluctuations can turn a lucrative investment one month
into a financial fiasco the next.395
The court in Schluter referred disapprovingly to the practice of “watchful
waiting,” suggesting that courts will not tolerate a party “waiting” and
“watching” as the value of the assets increases, only then seeking to enforce

390. Id. at 845.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Louisiana jurisprudence is replete with cases that acknowledge the
speculative nature of oil and gas activities, often resulting in a refusal to award
damages based upon “mere conjecture and speculation.” See, e.g., McCoy v. Ark.
Natural Gas Co., 165 So. 632 (La. 1936); Ferguson v. Britt, 185 So. 287 (La.
1938); Ludeau v. Cont’l Oil Co., 78 So. 2d 170 (La. 1955); Aladdin Oil Co., v.
Rayburn Well Serv., Inc., 202 So. 2d 477 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Veazey v. W. T.
Burton Indus., Inc., 407 So. 2d 59 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Coon v. Placid Oil Co.,
493 So. 2d 1236 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
395. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd. v. State Mineral Bd., 615 So. 2d 1051, 1056
(La. Ct. App. 1993).
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its rights.396 In the “oil patch,” both in the Bayou State and elsewhere, this
practice is called “laying behind the log,”397 and is widely viewed with
considerable disdain.
E. Arbitration of Disputes
Many agreements for the purchase and sale of oil and gas properties
contain a clause requiring the arbitration of any dispute arising out of the
agreement. Finding a provision involving a tiered approach to alternative
dispute resolution is not uncommon. Such a provision requires first, faceto-face negotiations between higher-level officers of each party. If that is
not fruitful, the agreement might then require mediation of the dispute. If
that does not resolve the issue, a mechanism is provided that arbitration
will resolve the dispute.
In particular, the PSA customarily provides for arbitration of disputes
arising out of the conduct of due diligence—particularly disputes as to
whether a title or environmental defect asserted by the purchaser is in fact
a defect meeting the definition of the agreement—or to ascertain the
appropriate adjustment to the purchase price. Similarly, if the parties
cannot agree on a proposed purchase price adjustment, a CPA with
experience in these matters might be designated to resolve the dispute.
Indeed, a PSA typically identifies the party who will be designated to
arbitrate or resolve the dispute, sometimes by name, but often merely by
qualification or scope of experience. To designate a “title arbitrator” or
“defect referee,” a clause such as the following might be used:
Any dispute shall be referred to a title attorney or other consultant
experienced in the examination of title to properties of a similar
character located in the state where the Assets are located
mutually agreed upon by Purchaser and Seller for prompt
resolution (the “Defect Referee”). The Defect Referee must have
at least 10 years’ experience and must not have worked as an
396. Schluter v. Gentilly Terrace Co., 114 So. 586, 588 (La. 1927).
397. Conduct typically called “laying behind the log” is viewed with
significant disdain in the oil and gas industry. See, e.g., J-O’B Operating Co. v.
Newmont Oil Co., 560 So. 2d 852, 860 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (finding, in an AMI
case, that a contrary ruling “would result” in an “obvious inequity,” the court
noted that “the AMI parties who agreed to bear the acquisition cost of the Texaco
sublease . . . shouldered the entire burden of the seismic program and thereafter
the risk of drilling the [Well], at a cost in excess of ten million dollars. Appellees
who bore neither the expense nor the risk of the venture now seek to participate
in the proceeds from a highly successful well.”). In the interest of full disclosure,
this Author represented a defendant in this suit.

778

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

employee or outside counsel for either Party or its Affiliates
during the 5-year period preceding the arbitration or have any
financial interest in the dispute.
In like manner, disputes as to the existence or appropriate remedial
action with respect to an environmental defect asserted by the purchaser
may be referred to environmental consultants or engineers, as the parties
might agree.
As a general proposition, the use of alternate dispute resolution is
preferred to litigation for a variety of reasons. First, the trier of fact is, by
definition, a person trained or experienced in the matter in dispute. In
contrast, the experience of a judge, competent as he or she might be, likely
does not include the technical aspects of title, environmental, or financial
matters presented in connection with producing oil and gas properties.
This is particularly important as the parties might have a continuing
relationship after the consummation of the transaction. Additionally, at
least in theory, the resolution can be achieved very promptly and less
expensively as compared to traditional civil litigation.398
If the parties so agree, the proceedings can be conducted in privacy.
The parties are free to contractually provide for the confidentiality of the
proceedings and all documents or exhibits filed in connection with those
proceedings. There is no reference in the arbitration statute of either
Louisiana399 or Texas400 to any requirement of privacy or confidentiality.
Texas statutory law does, however, contain a general requirement of
confidentiality of matters involved or presented in an “alternative dispute
resolution procedure.”401
Although fundamentally a matter to be determined by the contract of
the disputants, arbitrators are often required to take an oath that invokes
the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. This Code was
prepared in 1977 by a joint committee consisting of a special committee
of the American Arbitration Association and a special committee of the

398. “The traditional advantages given for arbitration over litigation are that
arbitration generally proceeds faster, is less costly and allows for a more
expeditious disposition of the case.” JAMES S. HOLLIDAY, JR., H. BRUCE SHREVES
& DALE R. BARINGER, LOUISIANA CONSTRUCTION LAW § 14:5 (West, Westlaw
2015).
399. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201 to :4217 (2009).
400. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001 to 171.098 (West Supp.
2014).
401. Id. § 154.073.

2016]

CLOSING THE DEAL IN THE BAYOU STATE

779

American Bar Association.402 Both organizations have approved and
recommended this Code.403 Canon VI of that Code provides that “an
arbitrator should keep confidential all matters relating to the arbitration
proceedings and decision.”
Finally, the decision of the competent arbitrator chosen by the parties
will be final, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. To the extent
that a party to traditional civil litigation feels relegated to inflexibly
following the rules prescribed by law, by the Code of Civil Procedure, by
local court rules, and by custom and practices in a civil court, with all of
the inconvenience, expense, and discomfort inherent, that same party has
the right to exercise “freedom of contract,” and construct a flexible,
reasonable, meaningful, inexpensive, non-intrusive, confidential, and just
regime to resolve a dispute. Thus, if a client does not want its company
hauled into an unfriendly forum; subjected to numerous, expensive, timeconsuming, limitless depositions; giving up its computers or records to
forensic examination; and potentially submitting its economic future to a
decision by a trier of fact who does not know a “Pugh Clause” from Santa
Claus, that client might consider including a tailored arbitration clause in
its contract.404
A recent case represents the intersection between purchase price
adjustments, in the sale of producing oil and gas properties, and the
resolution by arbitration.405 Chesapeake and BP entered into a PSA, in
which Chesapeake obligated itself to sell, and BP obligated itself to
purchase, certain oil and gas properties in Oklahoma for $1.75 billion.406
As is typical, the PSA allowed for adjustments to the purchase price based
upon title defects or title benefits discovered by the parties before
closing.407 Title defects would decrease the purchase price in favor of the
purchaser, and title benefits would increase the purchase price in favor of
the seller.408 More or less, claimed adjustments would not result in a

402. The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/AD
RSTG_003867 (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
403. Id.
404. For the importance and effectiveness of this ADR method in the context
of oil and gas contracts, see William Pitts, ADR in the Oil and Gas Context, 46
ANN. INST. ON MIN. LAW 157 (1999).
405. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, 747 F.3d 1253 (10th
Cir. 2014).
406. Id. at 1255.
407. Id. at 1256.
408. Id.
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modification of the purchase price unless they exceeded a threshold of $35
million.409
After closing, the parties agreed on title defects in the amount of
$116,234,556.410 The PSA had an arbitration provision relative to disputed
title defects and disputed title benefits.411 The parties submitted these
matters to arbitration in which BP sought approximately $46 million for
disputed title defects, and Chesapeake sought approximately $22 million
for disputed title benefits and other “credits.”412 During the arbitration
proceeding, BP submitted to Chesapeake a proposed final accounting
statement reflecting agreed title defects of approximately $80 million.413
Chesapeake responded with an exception report reducing the $80 million
to $58 million, a reduction of $22 million, which represented the title
benefits claimed by Chesapeake.414
The panel awarded $11.5 million to BP in title defects, and $3.7
million to Chesapeake in title benefits.415 In its award, “the panel noted
that it made no determination of whether these amounts exceeded the
aggregate threshold, or whether its ruling would actually cause any money
to exchange hands.”416 Chesapeake disputed the panel’s jurisdiction after
the entry of the first award.417 After further awards were entered,
Chesapeake filed a complaint in Oklahoma state court seeking to confirm
and modify the panel’s initial award, and to vacate the panel’s subsequent
award.418 The suit was removed to federal district court, and after due
proceedings, the court affirmed the panel’s awards.419 The case is more
interesting on the issues pertaining to arbitration, jurisdiction, and the
review of an arbitration award, than with respect to issues pertaining to
purchase price adjustments.
The cases noted above demonstrate the array of issues that might arise
in the purchase and sale of producing oil and gas properties, particularly
against the background of market conditions that might change drastically
from the date on which the PSA was executed through the date of closing.
As circumstances might change for a variety of reasons—pricing of
commodities, conditions of producing wells, title defects discovered
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1256–57.
Id. at 1257.
Id.
Id.
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during the due diligence period, etc.—the parties turn first to the terms of
the PSA to determine if closing can be delayed, enforced, or avoided
depending on the perspective of the party who considers itself adversely
affected by the condition.
CONCLUSION
Each PSA is unique to the transaction represented and its form and
structure is usually dictated by the preference and experience of the party
who generates the first draft. Typically, that party is the seller. Selfevidently, although the peculiarities of the transaction dictate the content
of the agreement, most forms of PSA tend to have similar types of
provisions that are pertinent to the assets being conveyed and purchased.
Similarly, the organization of the contract of sale, although it might
vary in specifics, will tend to address similar matters. As a consequence,
examining the general structure of a PSA as is typically encountered is
appropriate. Thus, the Appendix sets forth the titles of the particular
sections that might be encountered in a PSA. Although lacking in greater
specificity, the mere listing of topics might be of benefit to the lawyer
constructing a contract of sale for the disposition of producing oil and gas
properties.
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APPENDIX
As mentioned above, a detailed, section-by-section analysis of a
customary PSA would not be a fruitful exercise because the doctrine of
“freedom of contract” suggests that “one size does not fit all.” Further, the
commercial requirements and expectations of parties vary so greatly. For
this reason, the words typically and customarily are so generously used in
this Article. Despite the accuracy of these words, an identification of the
types of clauses or provisions that typically appear in PSAs for larger
transactions would be helpful and beneficial to at least prompt a party to
give consideration to issues that might be addressed in that type of
contract. For these reasons, the following list sets forth the types of clauses
or provisions that are often encountered in a transaction of this type.
Clearly, the main consideration in constructing an agreement is driven by
the nature of the assets, the condition of the property, the relative
sophistication and bargaining power of the parties, and the needs and
abilities of each party with respect to future liability.
•

Preface

•

Definitions and References
✓ Defined Terms

•

Property to be Sold and Purchased
✓ Properties
✓ Excluded Properties

•

Purchase Price
✓ Purchase Price
✓ Deposit

•

Representations of Seller
✓ Organization and Qualification
✓ Due Authorization
✓ Approvals
✓ Valid, Binding, and Enforceable
✓ Litigation
✓ Basic Documents
✓ Consents and Preferential Rights
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✓ Royalties, etc.
✓ Outstanding Obligations
•

Representations of Purchaser
✓ Organization and Qualification
✓ Due Authorization
✓ Approvals
✓ Valid, Binding and Enforceable
✓ No Litigation
✓ No Distribution
✓ Knowledge and Experience
✓ Opportunity to Verify Information
✓ Merits and Risks of an Investment in the Properties
✓ Financing

•

Certain Covenants
✓ Access to Records
✓ Physical Inspection
✓ Exculpation and Indemnification
✓ Interim Operation
✓ Preferential Rights and Consents
✓ Insurance
✓ Governmental Bonds
✓ Financial Assurances
✓ Notifications
✓ Employment

•

Due Diligence Review
✓ Review By Purchaser
✓ Nature of Defects
✓ NRI or WI Variances
✓ Liens
✓ Consents
✓ Environmental Matters
✓ Permitted Matters and Encumbrances
✓ Seller’s Response to Asserted Defects
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✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
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Cure
Postpone Closing
Adjustment
Resolution of Uncured Defects
Agree Upon Adjustments
Other Remedies
Adjustment For Certain Uncured Defects
NRI Variance/Proportionate Price Reductions
Liens/Payoff Amount

•

Dispute Resolution
✓ Possible Upward Adjustments
✓ Defect Dispute Resolution
✓ Limitations on Adjustments

•

Conditions Precedent to Closing Obligations
✓ Conditions Precedent to Closing Obligations of Purchaser
✓ Representations True and Correct
✓ Compliance with Covenants and Agreements
✓ Price Adjustment Limitations
✓ Litigation
✓ Conditions Precedent to Closing Obligations of Seller
✓ Representations True and Correct
✓ Compliance with Covenants and Agreements
✓ Price Adjustment Limitations
✓ Litigation

•

Closing
✓ Closing
✓ Seller’s Closing Obligations
✓ Delivery of Conveyance
✓ Federal and State Conveyance Forms
✓ Letters in Lieu
✓ Turn Over Possession
✓ Transition Agreement
✓ Other Agreements
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✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Purchaser’s Closing Obligations
Payment to Seller
Conveyance, etc.
Transition Agreement
Succession by Purchaser
Other Agreements
Post Closing Actions
Transfer of Files
Operational Transition
Notifications by Purchaser

•

Accounting Adjustments
✓ Adjustments for Revenues and Expenses
✓ Initial Adjustment at Closing
✓ Adjustment Post Closing
✓ No Additional Adjustments
✓ Imbalance Adjustments

•

Assumption and Indemnification
✓ Assumption and Indemnification By Purchaser
✓ Indemnification By Seller
✓ Limitation on Seller’s Indemnity Obligations
✓ Survival of Provisions
✓ Notice of Claim
✓ Cooperation by Purchaser

•

No Commissions Owed

•

Casualty Losses
✓ Casualty Loss
✓ Notices

•

Notices

•

Miscellaneous Matters
✓ Further Assurances
✓ Gas Imbalances, Make-Up Obligations
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✓ Waiver of Consumer Rights
✓ Parties Bear Own Expenses/No Special Damages
✓ No Sales Taxes
✓ Entire Agreement
✓ Amendments, Waivers
✓ Choice of Law, etc.
✓ Time of Essence
✓ No Assignment
✓ Successors and Assigns
✓ No Press Releases
✓ Counterpart Execution, Fax Execution
✓ Exclusive Remedy
✓ Imputed Knowledge and Waiver
✓ References, Titles, and Construction
✓ Severability
✓ Seller’s Obligations Several Not Joint
✓ Like Kind Exchange
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